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iPreface
This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the Subsea technology MSc program
at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU). The research presented has
been carried out at NTNU in Trondheim in the spring semester of 2015. The reader is assumed
to be familiar with the specialized field of human and organizational factors regarding drilling
and well operations. A decent understanding of the work done by James Reason (Reason, 1990)
and Barry Kirwan (Kirwan, 1994) is recommended to fully understand the findings in this thesis.
The reader is further assumed to have a basic knowledge of different standards and guidelines
like NORSOK D-010, NORSOK D-002 and OFL-117. The reader should also be familiar with sub-
ject in the NTNU courses TPK4120 Safety and Reliability Analysis, TPG4200 Subsea production
systems, TPK5165 RAMS Engineering and Management and TPG4105 Petroleum technology
The job market for the oil and gas industry is not at its peak at the moment. Discussion
with my supervisor Marvin Rausand reviled that a project related to human and organizational
factors could help opening doors for a possible career in other industries than the oil and gas
industry. The project started when Marvin sent me a survey performed by Birgit Vignes which
gave me many ideas on how to perform the project. The project has been carried out in coop-
eration with a drilling supervisor from the global oilfield service company Archer, employed at
Veslefrikk.
Trondheim, 2015-06-10
Alexander Fon Hals
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Summary and Conclusions
Well integrity affects safety, humans, the environment, production, reputations and assets value.
The concept of well integrity in relation to human and organizational factors have gained con-
siderable attention in the petroleum sector in Norway over the last few years. This is not without
reason. Resent studies shows that a simple mistake like dropping a hammer, may not only be
caused by the obvious direct cause like inattention but may be caused by several underlying
causes such as deficiencies in the design of the drill floor, operating instructions, follow-up of
safety notices, competence, planning and implementation, deficient management, and breach
of procedure. Historical events like the Piper Alpha incident shows that these underlying causes
or human and organizational factors are vital to develop and improve the systems. This means
that improving human and organizational factors may contribute to the improvement of well
integrity.
This thesis will explain the concept of human and organizational factors through a detailed
literature Survey. Different models and methods have been presented (the human performance
model, Decision making, the "Step ladder" decision model, performance influencing factors,
human error causation paradigm, human-, technology- and organizational perspective) to give
the reader a decent understanding of the concept. It is important for this thesis that the reader
is given a detailed insight in this aspect since most of the project tasks in this thesis is answered
using these models and methods.
Human error has been identified as a primary causal factor in 70-80% of accidents in the
oil and gas industry. Identifying and classifying the human and organizational factors of an ac-
cident is an effective tool to assist in the investigation process, the target training and make it
easier to implement prevention efforts. Through discussions and careful analysis of five meth-
ods deemed fit for classification of human and organizational factors in the oil and gas industry,
was the STEPP method identified as the best classification scheme for human and organiza-
tional factors relevant to well integrity in various phases of a well’s life.
Well integrity is vulnerable to unforeseen factors that have a critical influence on the work
performance. Understanding these unforeseen factors and the relationship between them through
a human, technological and organizational perspective can give better working environment
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and an opportunity to improve the health, safety integrity, and work performance. Challenges
revealed through the human, technological and organizational perspective were identified and
categorised as: well control training and knowledge, well integrity training and courses, human
computer interface, qualification and testing of well barrier elements, verification of well barrier
elements, automation, national and international standard, well integrity management system,
handover documentation and well barrier schematics.
Challenges related to human and organizational factor at Veslefrikk have been identified
using the human error causation paradigms. The different paradigms (the engineering error
paradigm, the individual error paradigm, the cognitive error paradigm and the organizational
error paradigm) look at the situation from different points of view. The results from this the-
sis identifies challenges at Veslefrikk related to: the driller’s chair, placement of communication
equipment, disturbing elements, alarms with no essential function, drillers workload, service
companies and their lack of risk understanding, difficulty in locating relevant procedures, the
sheer amount of procedures, time pressure, installation specific training, experience, meetings
is being prioritized ahead of actual drilling operation and the departure meetings are too gen-
eral. Comparison with the overall industry shows that the human and organizational factor
situation related to well integrity on Veslefrikk is overall better.
When all of this is taken into consideration means that this thesis objective:
Have the implemented measures proposed by PSA and DNV had any effect on the HO factors
related to well integrity in the various phases of a well’s life, at Veslefrikk?
Can simply be answered with the word, YES.
Measures can be initiated to eliminate the identified challenges at Veslefrikk and in the over-
all industry.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Well integrity is defined in NORSOK D-010 as "application of technical, operational and orga-
nizational solutions to reduce risk of uncontrolled release of formation fluids throughout the
life cycle of a well". Maintaining well integrity during all well operations has become a major
concern for operators worldwide. An increasing well stock with old wells and the higher cost as-
sociated with new wells, makes well integrity a critical element of asset lifecycle management.
Unfortunately pinpoints many accidents like the Snorre incident(Petroleum Safety Authority,
2005; Pettersen et al., 2006), the Montare incident (Stuart and Foo, 2010), the Macondo incident
(BP., 2010) and the Piper Alpha incident (Oil and Gass UK., 2008) that the focus on well integrity
in all phases of the well, still need further improvements.
Investigations of major accidents show that a problem area related to well integrity in all
phases, is the clear lack of focus on the interaction factors between human, technology and
organizational elements. These critical interactions of human and organizational (HO) factors
may be hard to detect if not all of the possible interactions between the different elements are
considered. Unforeseen critical interactions/factors may have a critical influence on the work
performance of the operators and crews, and may have a bad influence on well integrity. There-
fore the awareness of HO factors related to well integrity increased significantly over the last few
years. This thesis mainly addresses the studies preformed by the Petroleum Safety Authority
(PSA) and Det Norske Veritas (DNV) on the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS) (Asland et al.,
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2005, 2007; PSA, 2011a; Vignes et al., 2006; Vignes and Aadnoy, 2008; Vignes, 2011; Vignes and
Jayantha, 2011). The goal of the studies was to obtain a better understanding and overall per-
spective of the challenges in the industry. The main studies were preformed in 2005-2006 and
have led to industrial well integrity involvement as a development of the Norwegian Oil Indus-
try Association (OLF), Well integrity forum (WIF), OLF well integrity Guideline Number 117, well
integrity engineers, increased focus on well integrity competence and training exchange of well
integrity experience, handover documentation, well barrier schematics, well integrity catego-
rization, well integrity management systems (WIMS) and an increased focus on well integrity in
a life cycle aspect.
Relevant literature from academic articles and books related to the specialized field of hu-
man and organizational factors has been gathered which enables the opportunities to identify,
evaluate and study the challenges related to the complex interactions between human, technol-
ogy and organizational elements. The main literature sources for this thesis are the books "Hu-
man Error" and "A Guide to Practical Human Reliability Assessment" written by James Reason
and Barry Kirwan and relevant articles and documents written by Birgit Vignes in collaboration
with PSA. Other relevant articles , websites and books are listed in the bibliography. The nec-
essary data from Veslefrikk were manufactured using the questionnaire made by PSA and DNV.
The questionnaire is given in Appendix B.
Measures proposed by the PSA and DNV studies have been implemented for a few years
now. So a comparison with todays situation will revile if the implemented measures have had
any effect. Discussions with the drilling supervisor at Veslefrikk reviled that measures had been
implemented as a result of the studies, but he was uncertain if the implemented measures have
had any effective on the overall work performance. He emphasized that this is of interest for his
company (Archer) because it may lead to money savings, fewer accidents, etc. This led me to
the following question and this thesis objective:
Have the implemented measures proposed by PSA and DNV had any effect on the HO factors
related to well integrity in the various phases of a well’s life, at Veslefrikk?
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The problem area will be delimit to the HO factors in the drilling and well operations at Vesle-
frikk. The results gained from the studies conducted by PSA and DNV are used as a benchmark
to be able to compare today’s situation on Veslefrikk to the overall situation in the industry.
1.2 Project tasks
The following project tasks will be conducted to be able to answer this thesis objective:
1. Carry out and document a detailed literature survey related to human and organizational
(HO) factors.
2. Suggest a classification scheme for HO factors relevant to well integrity in the various
phases of a well’s life.
3. HO factors in the concept of well integrity: What does it mean and what is the importance?
4. Identify HO factors challenges in the drill and well working operations related to well in-
tegrity and thereby indirectly improving well integrity.
5. Compare today’s situation on Veslefrikk with the overall industry, relevant to HO factors.
1.3 Limitations
The identified challenges in the drill and well working operations are limited to the literature
review within this thesis. When writing a Master’s thesis, time is a limiting factor when collecting
information and analyzing the results. Also, I would like to mention that I am a student and not
a professional within the areas studied in this thesis.
There are some limitations regarding the questionnaire survey given to Harald Engesland.
The questions have not been customized for the human error causation paradigm. The full
potential of the method might have been hindered due to the fact that the data received was
imprecise in regard to the methods point of view. Also there is only one viewpoint for one indi-
vidual analyses which means that the results might give a false indicator on the "true" situation
on Veslefrikk.
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I would also like to mention that I’ve been unable to identify which implemented measures
was initiated on Veslefrikk, as a result of the original survey. I am therefore unable to identify
witch measures that have had any effect on reducing the challenges.
1.4 Approach
The approach to solve this thesis objective:
Have the implemented measures proposed by PSA and DNV had any effect on the HO factors re-
lated to well integrity in the various phases of a well’s life, at Veslefrikk?
is influenced by the fact that the author has limited experience and knowledge in the areas stud-
ied in this thesis. Therefore the theories and models presented might seemed a little bit simpli-
fied.
This thesis objective introduces a range of questions: What is HO factor, how can we classify
HO factors, how can we identify HO factors, what is HO factors in the context of well integrity
and so on. The project tasks are selected to try to answer this thesis objective in the best possible
way. The scientific approach to solve this thesis objective is:
1. First, a detailed literature survey will be presented to give the reader an insight into differ-
ent methods and model related to the HO factors. A presentation of the human-, technology-
and organizational (HTO) perspective together with an introduction to HO factor "way of
thinking" will be given. This will give the reader a detailed insight to HO factors and make
it possible to solve this thesis project task number one.
2. The objective of this thesis is strongly related to previous accidents, and how future acci-
dent can be avoided. The ability to prevent future accidents is the backbone of classifi-
cation schemes. The author’s approach to identify a classification scheme deemed fit to
the oil and gas industry, will be to present different methods of classification, then recom-
mend the best suited method to solve this thesis project task number two.
3. This thesis objective seeks to understand the challenges the industry is facing, regarding
HO factors in the context of well integrity. The author’s approach to understand and iden-
tify the challenges will be to give an introduction to the well integrity concept and identify
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challenges from a HTO perspective. This will solve this thesis project tasks number three
and four.
4. Finally, today’s situation on Veslefrikk must be properly understood to be able to com-
pare the results with the overall industry. Is the situation worse, better or the same, and
why? These questions are of interest for the oil and gas companies and it might be possi-
ble to answer or, at least give a hint toward the solution. The author’s approach to get an
overview of the complex work settings on Veslefrikk is to analyze the feedback data col-
lected with the human error causation paradigms. The result will then be compared with
the results from project task number four. Improvement measures proposed by Asland
et al. (2005, 2007) will be listed. This will solve this thesis project task number five.
1.5 Structure of the Report
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 gives the reader an insight into the human performance model, decision mak-
ing, work performance, performance influencing factors (PIFs) and the human error cau-
sation paradigm. A presentation of the HTO perspective together with an introduction to
HO factor "way of thinking" is also given.
• Chapter 3 presents the concept of Human Reliability Assessment (HRA), followed by the
general objectives and advantages of human error classification. The classification meth-
ods: "What, How and Why questions", "Skill-, Rule-, and Knowledge-Based Behavior",
"Slips, Lapses, Mistakes, and Violations", "Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction"
and "Sequential Time Event Plotting Procedure" are then presented. The method best
suited to classify HO factors related to well integrity is the recommended by the author.
• Chapter 4 will give the reader an introduction to the concept of well integrity and elaborate
on how HO factors can contribute to well integrity. The HTO perspective will be used to
identify the human element in improving well integrity, the technical element to improve
well integrity and the organizational element in improving well integrity.
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• Chapter 5 presents today’s situation on Veslefrikk regarding HO factors. The human error
causation paradigms are classified into four different paradigms: the engineering error
paradigm, the organizational error paradigm, the cognitive error paradigm and the in-
dividual error paradigm. These different paradigms are used to identify and classify the
challenges in the drilling and well operations from different points of view. The identi-
fied HO factor challenges will make it possible to compare today’s situation on Veslefrikk
with the overall situation in the industry. Recommendations for possible improvement
measures for each paradigm proposed by Asland et al. (2005, 2007) will be listed.
• Chapter 6 presents the summary and conclusion of the objective of this thesis, then the
summary and conclusion of this thesis project tasks, followed by the recommendations
for further work.
Chapter 2
Literature Survey related to Human and
Organizational factors
This chapter will give the reader an insight into the human performance model, decision mak-
ing, work performance, PIFs and the error causation paradigms related to HO factors. Also a
presentation of the HTO- and HO factors perspectives will be presented.
2.1 The Human Performance Model
The human performance model examines the factors involved in human performance and gives
an overview of the complex work setting. It helps to spot factors that may have a large potential
to contribute to work performance (Bailey, 1996). The model can thereby help to identify human
and organizational issues.
Performance can be divided into two levels (Bailey, 1996):
• The perfect performance
• The acceptable performance
The human performance is the activities carried out by the system’s human elements (Rea-
son, 1997). Optimal performance is something designers strive to achieve, but the reality is that
designers rarely have the requirements and resources to design for optimal performance. The
8
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only requirement is that the designers need to be able to ensure an acceptable level of human
performance. Work performance is described further in section 2.3. According to Bailey (1996)
the following components are needed to be able to predict human performance and to be able
to accomplish an acceptable or close to optimal performance: the human, the activity the hu-
man performs and the context in where the human activity is performed. The areas where the
human, the activity and the context collide and interact are also important to study. The inter-
actions between the human and activity element are a critical interface in regard to the human-
machine activities, while organizational barriers can unintentionally create interface problems
by providing resistance to change, or that the management does not pay attention to reward
good user interface. It is also important to understand that it is equally important to assess
the human, activity and context together, and the interactions between them, as to study them
separately (Bailey, 1996).
The human
The human is the most complex of the three elements in the human performance model (Bai-
ley, 1996). The senses (vision, hearing, etc.), the brain at cognitive level (the ability to think, find
reasons and make decisions) and the responders (arms, fingers, mouth, etc.) are considered in
the human elements. The designers do not know the humans who will work in their systems,
but it is important to understand and implement in the design how people sense, respond and
process information (Bailey, 1996).
Human performance can be affected both in a negative and a positive way. Reduced perfor-
mance could, for example, be expected because of poor sleep, unsatisfactory hearing, unac-
ceptable behavior (due to for example conflicts, attitude and lack of motivation), lack of abili-
ties or poor eyesight. Lack of knowledge, abilities and wrong attitude may be a source for bad
and incorrect decision making and lead to poorly acceptable performance. This illustrates that
attitude, knowledge and ability limitations affects the human capabilities and response to an
unexpected situation. It may therefore be a hindrance to be able to achieve the main purpose of
the task. Human qualities, characteristics and deficiencies should therefore probably be better
understood by the designers and engineers, and in the best possible way take them into account
when producing the system and making decisions. They have to handle the strengths and weak-
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nesses expected in an expected population of users (Bailey, 1996).
The activity
The activity performed is the next component in the human performance model, and includes
any required tools or equipment (Bailey, 1996). The conditions of performance and the executed
activities are controlled by the designer, both positively and negatively. It is important to know
which type of work can best be performed by certain people and what can be best performed
by computer- or automation systems. To be able to achieve sufficient skills for an acceptable
or near perfect level of human performance, it is important to know what kind of training is
required for the human to perform the activity.
The context
The context in which humans perform the activity may affect the performance and make a sig-
nificant difference for human performance. Decent working conditions must be provided to
the operators. Without this, distractions occur more frequently, which means safe operation of
the system may be compromised and the efficiency will drop. It is also important to match the
system to the mental ability and skill of the staff (Wong, 2002). Bailey (1996) defines the context
as "the circumstances in which an event occurs" and tree context considerations are described:
• The physical context
• The social context
• The psychological context
Physical context
The physical context includes the location and the environmental conditions. Examples are
noise level, temperature, lighting, vibration and pollution. Noise is probably the single most
studied factor in the physical context (Bailey, 1996).
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Social context
The social context includes conditions that may affect human performance, such as the effects
of other people, crowding, isolation and clustering (Bailey, 1996).
Psychological context
The psychological context may affect human behavior (Wong, 2002). Humans are unpredictable
and can have emotions that influence the way they behave and how they respond to the culture
at work. A strong and enthusiastic priority to develop a safety culture, education and training
related to the work performed is therefore important.
2.2 Decision Making
2.2.1 Potential Decision Making Challenges and Risks
Decision making may be very complex due to dependences between systems components that
contribute to a more challenging decision making process. Many parallel events and activities
take place in a complex system and these parallel activities may interact in non-obvious man-
ners if the system is characterized by high interactive complexity (Rosness et al., 2004). This
may lead to risk due to an increased probability of taking the wrong decisions with serious con-
sequences. Serious accidents may occur because decision making has been deficient due to
the fact that a incorrect decision was taken or because no decision was taken when required.
According to Hollnagel (1984), the decisions the person makes can shape the performance.
Today, operation centres may receive to much real-time data, and offshore personnel have to
cope with more information from the operation than they can handle (Grøtan and Albrechtsen,
2008). In addition, decisions taken at a distance from the actual operation, may increases the
likelihood of poor understanding and knowledge of the work settings. The conditions under
which decisions are made, strongly influence the outcomes and decision processes (Rosness,
2001). Figure 2.1 shows that communication and cooperation problems, conflicting objectives
and a demand of unnecessary information or too little information can cause risks. Also, more
group-based decision making may obscure who is responsible for performing the action.
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Figure 2.1: Main negative contributions - changes for interaction, communication, decisions
and safe operations. The figure is inspired by Tveiten et al. (2007)
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2.2.2 Two Dimensions and five Categories for Decision Making
As mention earlier decisions are made in different places in the actual operation. Rosness et al.
(2004) note that some decisions are made at the "sharp end" close to the hazard sources, others
are made at the blunt end, removed from the hazard sources. The level of authority indicated
by the decision makers and decision settings also differ. A manager can issue orders and direc-
tives to his or her subordinates, and an inspector can issue directives and impose sanctions on
companies (Rosness et al., 2004). Thus we can according to Rosness et al. (2004) characterize
decision settings, procedures and outcome according to two dimensions. This is illustrated in
Figure 2.2
• Proximity to the hazard source (operators facing a gas leakage are in a different situation
than the designer of the system)
• Level of authority (who can give orders and directives to whom)
Figure 2.2 also shows us that pilots, offshore platform superintendents or aircraft line mainte-
nance personnel usually find themselves at the sharp end, i.e., close to the hazard source. De-
signers, planners, analysts and regulatory institutions typically operate at the blunt end. Many
managers will move to the right in the Figure 2.2 in crisis situations and take a more operational
role and even "sharp-end" - decisions, which under normal conditions are left to the operator
(Rosness, 2001). These relationships are complex, since decision-makers also adapt to circum-
stances not covered by these two dimensions. However, Rosness et al. (2004) believe that even
a grossly simplified model of these relationships may be helpful in sensitising us to the way
decision-makers adapt to their setting. Therefore, five distinct decision settings can be identi-
fied and different proposals for associated typology of decision models can be made (Rosness
et al., 2004), see Table 2.1. It is also important to acknowledge that Hollnagel (1984) presented
different categories to define human decision making and actions.
• Decisions in situations that are familiar and frequent
• Decisions in situations that are familiar but infrequent
• Decisions in situations that are unfamiliar and infrequent
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Table 2.1: Dominant constraints, decision criteria and typical problems in different decision
mods (Rosness et al., 2004)
Decision
mode
Dominant con-
straints
Dominant decision
criteria
Typical problems
Political Conflicts of in-
terest
Robust consensus Inconsistency
Non-optimal deci-
sions
Erosion of safety
margins
Managerial Information pro-
cessing capacity
Find an option that is
good enough (satisfic-
ing)
Inafequate problem
definitions
Stick to SOP
Erosion of safety
margins
Analytical &
Bureaucratic
Hands-on
Knowledge
Comply with ruls &
standards
Optimise selected at-
tributes
Unrealistic assump-
tions
Deficient models
Erosions of safety
margins
Routine oper-
ations
Workload situa-
tion awareness
Smooth, efficient op-
eration
Optimise workload
Slips
Miss warnings
Local warnings
Erosion of safety mar-
gins
Crisis han-
dling
Stress
Time to obtain
information and
act
Avert catastrophic out-
comes
Avoid extreme stress
levels
Defective coping if
danger materialise
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Figure 2.2: Two dimensions for characterising setting for safety related decision making and
classes of decision processes. Adapted from (Rosness, 2001). (IMO - The International Maritime
Organisation; NPD - The Norwegian petroleum Directorate; CEO - Chief Executive Officer.)
The five different categories listed in Table 2.1 are (Rosness et al., 2004):
1. Political and bureaucratic decision making which is applicable in situations characterized
by conflict of interest. This conflict is between the parties who have roughly equal power
in relations to the decision. Typical decision problems may be inconsistency, non-optimal
decisions and erosion of safety margins (Rosness et al., 2004).
2. Managerial also known as "satisfying decision making" characterizes many management
decision makers that do not have the capacity to search for the optimal action alternative.
The manager therefore chooses the first acceptable alternative. The working day for man-
agers at high levels are characterized by many decisions, lack of time and large amounts of
information to be handled. Typical decision problems are inadequate problem definitions
and erosion of safety margins (Rosness et al., 2004).
3. Bureaucratic planning or optimization means that one under the given constraints seek
an optimal decision alternative based at models that does not capture the reality together
with incomplete knowledge. Designers, planners and risk analysts often have sufficient
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time to focus on optimization, but they often lack experience with the systems they are
working with. Other problems may be unrealistic assumptions, limited feedback, defi-
cient models and erosions of safety margins (Rosness et al., 2004).
4. Routine operations decision may lead to conflicting objectives between process opera-
tors and others who work close to sources of danger. The most of the time they have a
focus on operating efficiency, avoidance of interruption and keeping their workload at an
acceptable level. The routine decisions can be fully automated or programmed through
procedures and instructions. Typical problems may be slips, missed warnings and erosion
of safety margins (Rosness et al., 2004).
5. Crisis handling decision happens when the decision maker face imminent threats. A typ-
ical problem may be unpleasant stress, psychological limitations and defective coping if
danger materializes (Rosness et al., 2004).
2.2.3 The "Step ladder" Decision Model
Decision models are proposals that predicts how the internal processes of the decision making
system are organized and structured, and account for how decisions are made. The human
performance model known as the Step Ladder Model is the best known model and developed
by Rasmussen (1983). The model is illustrated in Figure 2.3. This model, depicts the various
stages that a worker could go through when handling a process disturbance (Rasmussen, 1983).
If the worker has to utilize the knowledge based mode he or she will traverse every informa-
tion processing stage represented by the boxes connected by the arrows in Figure 2.3 (Embrey).
As in the GEMS1 model, if the situation is immediately recognized, then a pre-programmed
physical response will be executed in the skill based mode (e.g. by moving the process on to
the next stage by pressing a button)(Embrey). The "Step-ladder" model identifies eight steps
of decision making from activation to execution (Redmill and Rajan, 1997) and three types of
decisions are identified (Rasmussen, 1986) listed in Table 2.2.
According to Embrey, it might be necessary to go to the rule based level if the nature of the
problem is not readily apparent. A diagnostic rule will be applied to identify the state of the
1A generic error-modelling system
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Table 2.2: Identified steps of decision making and different types of decisions (Redmill and Ra-
jan, 1997; Rasmussen, 1986).
Decision making Decisions types/categories
1. Activation - Detection of need for data pro-
cessing.
1. Skill-based - decisions proceed directly
from detection to the execution with few in-
termediate mental steps.
2. Observation - Gathering of information and
data.
2. Rule-based - decisions require a mental rep-
resentation of the system state (e.g. the air
traffic situation), and the selection of an ap-
propriate procedure based on the recognition.
3. Identification - Naming the present state of
the system.
3. Knowledge-based - Decisions proceed
through casual reasoning.
4. Interpretation - Considering the conse-
quences for current task, safety, efficiency, etc.
5. Evaluation - Evaluating the alternatives in
relation to the chosen performance criteria.
6. Goal Selection - Selecting the appropriate
change of system conditions.
7. Procedure selection - Planning the sequence
of actions.
8. Execution - Carrying out the planned ac-
tions and coordinating them.
plant and an action rule will be used to select an appropriate response. Embrey further says
that control will revert to the skill based level to actually execute the required actions. More
abstract functions such as situation evaluation and planning will only be required at the knowl-
edge based level if the problem cannot be resolved at the rule based level.
The thicker blue arrows in Figure 2.3 represent typical short cuts that skip steps in the in-
formation processing chain. This short cuts may be an efficient and safe way to make decisions
and lead to errors only in certain cases. For example, the worker may erroneously believe that he
or she recognise a pattern of indicators and may immediately execute a skill based response, in-
stead of moving to the rule based level to apply an explicit diagnostic rule (Embrey). The dotted
lines in Figure 2.3 represent the various feedback paths that make it possible for the individuals
to identify if a particular stage of the processing chain was executed correctly. In other words if
the operating team executed a planned strategy to handle a complex plant problem, eventually
feedback would be obtained regarding whether or not the plan was successful. A different set
of feedback loops exists at the rule and skill based levels, and indicate opportunities for errors
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Figure 2.3: Decision-Making Model including Feedback (adapted from Rasmussen (1983))
corrections (Embrey).
This model has been applied with some success by a number of researchers (Redmill and
Rajan, 1997). One of the advantages of the "Step-ladder" model is that it specifies the correct
and complete way to execute the procedure and it also accounts for the various ways in which
shortcuts be made (Hollnagel, 1984).
2.3 Work Performance
Work performance is in direct relation to the quality of employees as well as their desire for suc-
cess for the company and themselves. The work related activities expected of an employee and
how well those activities were executed determine the performance. Through self motivation
and motivation from management, work performance can be improved to create a positive en-
vironment. This means that to be able to assess and improve the human performance, HTO
elements and the HTO interactions in complex work settings, the knowledge of work perfor-
mance can be used to create a work situation which actively contributes to a safe and efficient
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operation, taking into account opportunities, limitations and human needs.
Figure 2.4: A System-Focused Model of Work Performance (Waldman, 1994).
Work performance is defined by Campbell (1990) as behavior associated with the accom-
plishment of expected, specified, or formal role requirements on the part of individual organi-
zational members. Thus, work performance includes in-role behavior that can be contingently
tied to reward. This definition may be difficult to understand. Figure 2.5 shows work perfor-
mance together with its dimensions and indicators to give a more clear description of what
work performance is and what it consists of. Important elements of work performance like job
satisfaction, job attitudes, personality , motivation, leadership, and, to a lesser extent, group
processes and organization design are important to understand to be able to achieve an accept-
able or close to optimal human performance. These elements are not further described in this
thesis, but is covered in more detail by Blumberg and Pringle (1982).
It is now clear that for companies to achieve efficient and safe workplace, an optimized work
performance should be reached, but this is challenging due to many unexpected factors influ-
encing the work performance under different working conditions and operational settings. To
understand what is meant by work performance the first step is to make informed decisions
(Redmill and Rajan, 1997). Different PIFs affect the work performance and the human ability to
improve performance. To elaborate and to improve work performance in complex work settings
the human error causation paradigms can help.
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Figure 2.5: Heuristic framework of work performance (Koopmans et al., 2011)
2.3.1 Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs)
Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs) or Performance shaping Factors (PSFs) (Jae and Won-
dea, 2003), are factors that combine with basic human error2 tendencies to create error-likely
situations. This means that these factors may and can often be the reason for human errors. The
ability to improve and improvise work performance may also be affected by these factors. Em-
bray (2000) defines PIFs as "those factors which determine the likelihood of error or effective hu-
man performance". When PIFs relevant to a particular situation are optimal then performance
will also be optimal and error likelihood will be minimised (Embray, 2000).
Identified PIFs can be used as an audit tool, to identify problem areas that give rise to in-
creased error potential (Embray, 2000). To be able to achieve a safe and effective performance
a detailed understanding and knowledge about PIFs is critical. Valuable information is gained
that make it possible to make specific measures to reduce the negative effects on the perfor-
mance. The human sense organs; eyes, ears, nose, taste and sensory receptors in the skin receive
stimuli which are processed in the human brain, and may affect the performance.
ExproBase. (2008) suggests that PIFs can be divided into workplace related factors and hu-
2The failure of planned actions to achieve their desired ends-without the intervention of some unforeseeable
event (Reason, 1997)
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man related factors:
• Workplace related factors (economy, environment, equipment, routines, layout, personnel
policy)
• Human related factors (psychological factors, personal factors and physiological factors)
Another way of classifying PIFs is suggested by Redmill and Rajan (1997) and is shown in
Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: PIFs, work related and human related factors (Redmill and Rajan, 1997).
PIFs combined with basic human errors are factors that can create critical operational situa-
tions with serious consequences. Luckily, the likelihood of errors happening can be minimized
if PIFs are identified, classified and optimized. A result of the identified PIFs is that the work
performance may also be improved. This means that failing in this identification of PIFs may
have a significant impact to human errors, poor decision making and reduced performance.
2.4 The Human Error Causation Paradigms
"A common failing of mankind is to never anticipate a storm when the sea is calm" is a quote
written by Niccolo Machiavelli. It means by not anticipating that thing, once they had become
calm, could ever stir back up, would result in higher likelihood of getting caught unprepared
when trouble arose (Philosiblog., 2012).
The sources, issues and conditions for human error are almost endless in a given work set-
ting. To get a clear understanding of the complex interactions together with an informative
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overview of the complex work settings, the human error causation paradigms that were pro-
posed by Redmill and Rajan (1997) are presented in this section. These can be a tool for helping
companies to be "prepared for a storm". Or to put in different words, implement measures to
hinder such situations (storms) by spotting the critical influence factors that have a great poten-
tial to influence and contribute to safety and work performance risks.
The human error causation paradigms include the engineering error paradigm, the indi-
vidual error paradigm, the cognitive error paradigm and the organizational paradigm (Redmill
and Rajan, 1997). To be able to evaluate the challenges from different points of views, are the
paradigms different from each other. The different paradigms help to identify and to seek to an-
swer what are the challenges and influencing factors in the given working situations and what
can be done to improve the work setting. The four paradigms are shown in Figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7: The four error causation paradigms (Reason, 1997).
The Engineering Error Causation Paradigm
The engineering error causation paradigm relates to the design and the technical aspect of a
system. The main characteristic of the engineering error paradigm is the recognition that the
human is an unreliable part/hardware component in the system (Vignes and Jayantha, 2011).
Human-mahine design, human-computer design and automation are important aspects in this
paradigm and these are performed by the companies to improve the performance and to re-
duce the risk and the cost (Brown and Hellerstein, 2009). Automation is used to replace the
operators with a machine and thereby design the human "out of the loop". This has great in-
fluence on the error potential since the human constitute a major part of the possible error
potential. Automation is performed to "engineer out" human failures and thereby removes the
"human factor" entirely (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). New sources of human unreliability can
be introduced when using automation. According to Bainbridge (1983) and Redmill and Ra-
jan (1997) "the ironies of automation" occur where errors can be introduced into a system by a
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system designer during a design process. The operator may also become de-skilled over time,
and errors can occur when the automated system fails and the operator has to perform the task
(Vignes and Jayantha, 2011). Therefore, automation is not always proven to be cost-reducing
and effective, but rather the opposite (Redmill and Rajan, 1997; Brown and Hellerstein, 2009).
The automated systems constantly needs maintenance, updated structured inputs and design,
implementation and testing which contributes to a massive expense. According to Vignes and
Jayantha (2011), the most important issues related to the risk and the recovery from failures or
errors are considerably more complicated in an automated process than in a manual process.
From a human-machine interaction view (illustrated in Figure 2.8), errors can often occur as a
Figure 2.8: Human Machine interaction (University in Zurich, 2014)
result of a human-machine mismatch between the demands of the task, the physical capabil-
ities of the person, and the characteristics of the interface(Redmill and Rajan, 1997). This can
be illustrated by referring to the PSA and their safety assessment related to alarm systems on
seven offshore production installations in Norway (Bjerkeback and Eskedal, 2004). The assess-
ment states "poor alarm systems performance and management represents the greatest human
factor challenge within control room environments offshore". The alarm rates during a normal
operation varied from 1 to 20 alarms per ten minutes and the alarm rates during a tripp3 or a
shut down ranged from 33 to 399 alarms during the first minute. The high alarm rates was the
main consequence of poor alarm system management. The rates were unacceptable in terms
of introducing a risk of overlooking, misunderstanding, or giving inadequate operator response
3The act of running or pulling drill pipe into or out of a wellbore on a drilling rig
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when important alarms are introduced (Bjerkeback and Eskedal, 2004).
The individual and the immediate work situation is a big part of the engineering error paradigm,
mainly because there is a clear connection to the socio-technical working context and the human-
machine interactions which is in direct contact with the operator (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). All
attributes of an interactive system (alarm management, panels, displays, screens, task aids, con-
trols and software devices) that provides the information and controls necessary for the operator
to perform tasks is included in the term Human Machine Interface (HMI), illustrated in Figure
2.9.
Figure 2.9: A simple Human Machine Interphase (HMI) model.
The Individual Error Causation Paradigm
The individual error causation paradigm relates to personal characteristics, such as the person’s
personality, attitude, and safety attributions (Vignes and Jayantha, 2011). Even a very profes-
sional design may have the tendency to lead to errors in the presence of such personnel char-
acteristics. The human is very difficult to control and predict its moments/action because of its
unpredictability and diversity. This view presents that human errors occur because the human
is "not trying hard enough" or "not playing sufficient attention to the task", and the solution
to human error are often related to disciplinary measures such as dismissal and suspension
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(Redmill and Rajan, 1997). According to Redmill and Rajan (1997) is the Airbus A320 (1992) ac-
cident, which crashed into a hill near Strasbourg is a good example illustrating the individual
error paradigm related to motivation and safety attribution. The accident rapport stated that
the pilot ordered the aircraft to descend at 3300 feet per minute rather then an angel of 3.3 de-
grees. The error occurred because the aircraft had different modes in the display that looked
almost the same. One described the climbs and descend in degrees, the other in units of 100
feet per minute. The error that was made is well known and well understood but still it hap-
pened, and tragically resulted in severe consequences. In this particular case, the pilot made
an individual error that can be related to the pilot’s personality, motivation, and safety attribu-
tions (Vignes and Jayantha, 2011). Human (in this case the pilot) performing "corner cutting" in
work situations can be attributed to safety attitudes, beliefs, risk-taking behavior, conflict and
motivation (Redmill and Rajan, 1997) and in this case this was exactly what happened. The Air-
bus A320 accident can also be read as an engineering error paradigm focusing on the technical
aspects of a system, the design of man-machine, and human-computer interfaces. A better en-
gineering error causation paradigm focus would have avoided the possible misunderstanding
of the different modes in the autopilot display by good design of the human-machine interface.
However, even a very professional design may have a tendency to lead to errors, in the presence
of problems of personality, motivation, and safety attributions of the human operators (Vignes
and Jayantha, 2011).
For some time now, has there been an increasing focus by the petroleum industry on the vi-
olations of rules or procedures and particularly non-malevolent violations such as not wearing
personal protection equipment or corner cutting. This is a form of human failure that can be
attributed to safety attitude and motivation; it can also affect the safety culture within a com-
pany, the risk taking behavior, and factors such as the conflict of productivity and safety goals
(Redmill and Rajan, 1997). The Texas City disaster in 2005 at BP’s refinery in Texas is a good ex-
ample illustrating the individual error paradigm related to safety culture (BP., 2005; Petroleum
Safety Authority Norway, 2009). Fifteen people were killed and over 170 people were harmed
because of fire and explosion caused by leaking hydrocarbons. The accident report concluded
that the safety culture at the refinery was unsatisfying. Personnel did not follow the established
policies and procedures, also the focus to the company was more about the incident statistics
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rather then actual process safety and the risk of major accidents. Current research is looking
at perceptions of risk and safety climate or safety culture issues (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). Ac-
cording to Sharp (2004) can the climate account for 20 to 30% of the business performance. The
climate is defined as how the people feel about working for a company (Ivancevich and Mat-
terson). This means that getting the best out of people will eventually pay off for the company.
Further research also shows that the level of control over its basic risk factors in an organization
is related to the climate and whether the people are healthy, happy, and productive employees
(Vignes and Jayantha, 2011).
The Cognitive Error Causation Paradigm
The cognitive error causation paradigm focuses on the psychological attributes and the infor-
mation processing-related causes of human errors, and it covers both skills and decision making
errors and considers the capabilities and limitations of the individual human information pro-
cessing system (Redmill and Rajan, 1997; Wong, 2002). With the cognitive view human errors
are analysed in relation to the abilities of information processing, the interaction with individ-
ual tasks and situations, and human error tendencies.
An example that emphasizes the importance to maintain an overview on the complex set of
factors in the system to reduce decision making errors is the Chernobyl disaster (Wong, 2002).
The water cooled nuclear reactor at Chernobyl was known to be unstable, and meltdown was
possible if output was below 20 %. The reactor included a safety system to prevent operation
below 20 %. The investigation report states that the safety system was removed because of test-
ing and the possibility for a meltdown with the safety system disabled was never seen as a real
danger. The reactor becomes unstable during testing and because of design weaknesses, the
manual intervention done by the operators was too slow to prevent the disaster (Vignes and
Jayantha, 2011). This accident pointed out that a number of issues exist that directly challenges
the cognitive capacities and capabilities of operators of complex systems.
The cognitive error causation paradigm assumes that mismatches between mental and phys-
ical capabilities of people and the demand of the job performed is why the human errors occurs.
According to the paradigm, the error reduction is dependent on the cognitive causes such as in-
formation overload, memory failure, attention failure, and decision making failures (Redmill
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and Rajan, 1997; Wong, 2002). The mental state of humans, and errors related to the emotional
state of mind, can even be caused by very personal reasons such as divorce or separation, death
in the family, or other work-related complaint or protest. Therefore these human errors can
never be totally eliminated, but the person can be removed from work tasks until the situation
has improved and he or she has gained a better attitude (Wong, 2002). Redmill and Rajan (1997)
states that errors related to the "I don’t care" attitude can also result in lack of motivation, con-
centration and behavior and performance in respect of rules and regulations.
The Organizational Error Causation Paradigm
The Organizational error causation paradigm has a broader perspective than the paradigms pre-
sented earlier. The paradigm focuses on the management practices, such as safety management
and decision making, and issues such as safety culture, participation, competence, control, and
communication (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). The paradigm also assumes that human errors are
caused by certain preconditions in the work context. These can include aspects such as poorly
designed procedures, unclear allocation of responsibilities, lack of knowledge or training, low
morale, poor equipment design, and time pressure. To illustrate the important of the organi-
zational error paradigm the Ekofisk Brovo blowout (1977) can be used as an example (Oil Rig
Disasters database., 2009). The accident happened during a workover at a production well. Ten
thousand feet of production tubing was pulled out of the well, the christmas tree had been re-
moved, and the BOP had not been installed. The well then kicked4 and an incorrectly installed
downhole safety valve failed. All of these factors resulted in a blowout and uncontrolled re-
lease of oil and gas, luckily the platform personnel were evacuated, and none were injured. The
official investigation reports stated that the mechanical failures of the downhole safety valve
occurred because of human error. The human errors included faults in the installation docu-
mentation, equipment identification, well planning, and well control. The conditions required
for situations like Ekofisk Bravo blowout to happen, can be tracked back to management and
organizational policies and decisions. Other general failure types and aspects which may cause
unsafe acts and affect decision making are poor management decision making and planning,
communication failures, poor safety management, inappropriate workload levels and lack of
4A kick can quickly escalate into a blowout when the formation fluids reach the surface
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competence (Redmill and Rajan, 1997).
2.5 Human, Technology and Organization perspective
The HTO perspective was developed during the 1980s within the nuclear power industry. The
aim of the HTO perspective was to improve the overall safety. When developing safety elements,
the focus was usually only put on the technical improvements. This focus was successful and
near-accident incidents caused by technical failures were noticeably reduced. This effect of the
reduction of the technical failures resulted in that the incidents caused by humans become more
"visible" as they represented a larger proportion of the reported incidents. This resulted in an
increasing focus on the field of potential "human error" and safety was further improved. After
this revelation and understanding that safety needed a technical aspect and a human aspect, it
also become apparent that it was necessary to consider organizational issues as well. This led
to the realization that all three HTO components in the system need to be addressed to improve
safety (Eklund, 2003).
The system view from the HTO perspective was considered successful for improving safety
and developing a more thorough safety culture and has thereafter spread to other domains (Rol-
lenhagen, 1997, 2003). The HTO perspective has now been developed to analyse and further
develop the understanding of highly complex work activities. It has been understood that suc-
cessful development is only achieved if all three components are considered together. Figure
2.10 illustrates the relations and the components in the HTO perspective. The HTO perspective
is also valuable in research as it ensures that a broad range of factors are considered. Where
a specific focus is chosen for research, for instance focusing on technology while human and
organizational aspects may be analysed and treated as influencing factors (Westlander, 1999a).
There is a relations to the earlier socio-technical system theory, which aims at improving work-
ing conditions as well as organizational performance (Pasmore, 1988). The HTO perspective,
however, distinguishes between the individuals and the organization.
In the HTO perspective, the "H" stands for the Human component and introduce the impor-
tant aspects that are strictly individual and at the same time considered important to perform
task or a change. Such aspects may, for example, include individual skill, knowledge, experi-
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Figure 2.10: The H-, T-, and O-component in the HTO perspective.
ences, and established relations with other people. They are not easily replaceable in a short
term perspective. The H-component focuses on the individual’s contribution to the business
process. According to Daniellou (2001) the H-component can be described at any of the follow-
ing four levels.
1. The biological level, regarding the human as a physiological system.
2. The cognitive level, where the human is considered as an information-processing system,
including thought processes, representation, and decision-making.
3. The psychological level, where the human has a unique history, leading to a specific sub-
jective processing of the situations he/she experiences.
4. The social level, emphasizing that every single individual is a member of several social
groups with different cultures, which will partly determine his/her values and habits.
The second component is the "T" and stands for the technical system. This can be divided
into two different parts. The first part is the primary technical production system that includes
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the production equipment. It is primarily devoted to maintaining the abilities of the company
to stay competitive in the business and to produce customer value. There are different ways
of describing these complex technical systems concerning the technical limitations, problems
(both recurrent and stochastic), availability, reliability etc. Because the technical system is so
complex leads to the need to consider these systems as networks of linked autonomous parts,
which are to a large extent separately controlled and managed. The second part of the technical
system is the secondary technical system. The secondary technical system is the system that
assists the administration and procedures of the company, but is not directly associated with
the value-adding activities of the business (Wäfler, 2001). This information system includes
both hardware and software that the scheduler uses as decision support tools.
Some criteria that have proven to be valid for the design of the scheduling software system
set by the HT-interaction are (Wiers, 2001):
• Whether it is integrated with the taks
• Whether it is tolerant of errors
• Whether it provides relevant feedback
• Whether it is transparent for the scheduler i.e. that the scheduler can understand or has
confidence in the relation between the decision support and his/her own understanding
of the situation
The third and last component is the "O" that stands for the Organization component and it
represents the H-component in an aggregated sense (Berglund and Karltun, 2007). It is there-
fore not considering single individuals but humans in a statistical interchangeable way (West-
lander, 1999a). The O-component comprises how the work is organized and structured, both
formally and informally, furthermore it includes rules, procedures and cultural factors as well
as relations between system components and subsystems, which all have both a formal and in-
formal side (Westlander, 1999b). It can also be important to notice that the O-component have
a physical aspect regarding where people are located and how premises are design (Weisbord,
2004). Examples of this are job definitions, responsibilities and powers, hierarchical positions,
policies, business goals and strategies (Berglund and Karltun, 2007). Problems related to the
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organizations is often goal conflicts between departments (subsystems) and are something the
schedulers also must deal with.
The interaction between the scheduler and the organization is naturally very extensive and
can be described with different levels and from different perspectives. There are role expecta-
tions and roles sent form different parts of the organization, naturally from managers following
the hierarchical position but also from colleagues and workers (Berglund and Karltun, 2007).
According to Katz and Kahn (1978) the roles become more complex when they require the indi-
vidual to be simultaneously involved in two or more subsystems, since each one is likely to have
its own priorities and to some degree its own subculture. The performance of the schedulers
is believed to be influenced by the demands and expectations that are placed upon them. The
complexity of the schedulers roles is described by Jackson et al. (2004) and suggested to divide
these into three main roles: the informational role, the interpersonal role and the decisional role.
It is now clear that knowledge and understanding of the H-,T- and O-components and the
HTO interactions are vital to achieve a safe and effective operation, decision making and work
performance. The human performance model, PIFs and human error causation paradigms pre-
sented earlier, are all apart of the HTO perspective and can help identifying and solve challenges
related to the perspectives "way of thinking". This may result and contributes to a better deci-
sion making process and a higher performance, reliability, effectiveness and safety.
2.5.1 Application of HTO knowledge
The application of the HTO knowledge can provide clarity, increased understanding and aware-
ness of the interplay between human, technological and organizational matters. Better under-
standing may have a positive effect to the improvement of safety, performance, reduced system
vulnerability and the decision making quality. According to Vinnem and Liyanage (2008) the
enabling of technologies and infrastructure to support complex operations is a way to draw at-
tention to critical interactions and interfaces between human and organizational components
of the systems.
Better knowledge and understanding of the interactions between the HTO elements is cru-
cial in understanding the underlying causes of incidents and accidents in work processes and to
achieve success in the preventive work (Petroleum Safety Authority Norway., 2011). A situation
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when human, technology, organization and work processes are combined and make complex
interactions can lead to big loses. The interactions are illustrated in Figure 2.11.
Figure 2.11: HTO - and Work Process interactions .
According to Bridger (1995) the improvement of the interactions between human compo-
nents, technical components and organizational components is crucial to the system to func-
tion better. This is a basic element in the HSE (Health, Safety and Environment) regulations in
the petroleum activities (Petroleum Safety Authority Norway., 2011).
The socio-technical system in which modern society is based, tends to increase the system
complexity. This has a unavoidable consequence, namely that the interactions and dependency
between the individual systems increase, and thereby the systems become more closely coupled
(Hollnagel, 2004). Tighter couplings results in systems become more difficult to use, in therms
of maintenance, operation, monitoring, management and control (Hollnagel, 2004). Harmony
between the human, technological and organizational elements of operational setting in a com-
plex setting/system is extremely critical for exposure of operational risk. Table 2.3 describes
examples of some components and situations concerning the human, technology and organi-
zational elements which must be handled during complex operations. HTO knowledge appli-
cation can help to create a better understanding of the interactions between the elements, and
it can provide a greater overview of the modern complex work system. A lack of identification
an classification of HTO limitations, together with PIFs studies, may lead to human errors and
reduced work performance. It illustrates the importance and advantages of a proper knowledge
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Table 2.3: Describes components and situations concerning the human, technology and orga-
nizational elements
The Human element The Technology element The Organization element
DCompetency and educa-
tion
DAbilities, experience and
learning
DPlanning
DManning and training
DCommunication and co-
operation
DPhysiology, Psychology
and sociology
DTime and human limita-
tions
DHuman needs and re-
sponsibility
DOperational work tasks
DDecision making
DWork Performance
DComplex work tasks
DStress and workload
DData interpretation
DToo much or too little in-
formation
DAttention
DPersonality and motiva-
tion
DBehavior during opera-
tions
DAlertness
DAbility to perceive abnor-
mal conditions
DCognitive workload and
demands
DFatigue
DMemory and attention
DAttitude to safety
DEtc.
DDesign of the system
DLimitations due to the
design
DHow the technical ele-
ment supports the operators
to perform their work safe
and effectively
DDegree of automation
DFunctionality
DUsability
DIntegration
DOperational tasks
DNoise, vibration and tem-
perature level
DCompatibility of usertech-
nology interface
DFunctional characteristics
of control panels
DFalse alarms
DDesign faults
DTechnical error
DClarity of signals and user-
friendliness
DWork space
DCompatibility and relia-
bility of displays and con-
trols
DNew technology and
equipment
DLocation
DEtc.
DResponsibility, roles and
management
DProcedures
DCommunication
DCompetency
DOrganizational manning
DResource availability
DTraining programs
DPlanning and routines
DCulture and structure
DFramework
DPower relations
DCooperation
DDecision making
DWork Performance
DHandover documentation
DStandardization
DContractual issues
DPsychosocial working
conditions
DWorking environment
DSharing of experience
DControl of environment
DTeam structure
DDecision support systems
DPhysical working condi-
tions
DConflicts
DWork instructions
DTime constraints
DInteraction with other
tasks
DEtc.
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of complex work settings from an HTO perspective and an overall understanding of the capabil-
ities, interactions and PIFs is critical to achieve the organizational goals, and safe and effective
operations.
2.6 What are Human and Organizational factors?
The concept of HO factors is important for this thesis, therefore the concept is explained in
detailed in this section. Some repetition will therefore occur.
Accidents have always been present in all sorts of industry. Incident investigation is there-
fore a core skill for health and safety in a company. Incidents happen for a number of reasons
and without finding out the cause, an event cannot be prevented from recurring. Analysing the
system reveals inherent weaknesses and help identifying root causes of serious incidents. When
the causes of incidents is revealed, safety barriers to prevent them from happening can be put
into place. The notion of safety barriers in industry is based on the accident theory known as the
energy model, pioneered by Gibson (1961) and Haddon (1980). Since the idea was developed,
the safety barrier concept has evolved from simple physical barriers protecting against harmful
energies to include successive risk reducing measures either of a human, technical or organiza-
tional nature. In the later years this interaction between human, technology and organization
has been identified as a critical factor regarding safety. This interaction between human, tech-
nology and organization is called HO factors and can be defined in several ways. Koester (2001)
defines HO factors as a:
Discipline regarding human abilities and limitations in relation to the design of systems, orga-
nizations, tools etc.
Another definition by Chapanis (1996) is as follows:
Human factors are a body of information about human abilities, human limitations, and hu-
man characteristics that are relevant to design
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The International Ergonomics Association. (2000) has a more complex definition of HO factors:
Ergonomics (or human factors) is the scientific discipline concerned with the understanding of
the interactions among humans and other elements of a system, and the profession that applies
theoretical principles, data and methods to design in order to optimize human well being and
overall system performance. Practitioners of ergonomics, ergonomics, contribute to the planning,
design and evaluation of tasks, jobs, products, organizations, environments and systems in order
to make them compatible with the needs, abilities and limitations of people.
By putting all of these definitions together we can understand that HO factors is a term used
to describe the interactions of individuals with each other, with facilities and equipment, and
with management systems. The interaction between these elements is influenced by both the
working environment and the culture of the people involved. This mean that one good working
system in one part of an organisation, may be identified as a problem area in a region where
for example culturally driven attributes to risk taking may be significantly different. Figure 2.12
shows the different elements in HO factors and what the different elements consists of accord-
ing to OGP (The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers).
Figure 2.12: Culture and working environment, nation, local and workplace culture, social and
community values (OGP.).
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The different definitions mentioned may be difficult do understand without a proper psy-
chology training. Therefore is the definition proposed by the Health and Safety Executive HSE
(1999) widely acceded inn industries:
"Human factor refers to environmental, organizational and job factors, and human and indi-
vidual characteristics which influence behavior at work in a way which can affect safety".
A better understanding of the elements in this definition gives us a simple way to view HO fac-
tors. The tree aspects are: the job, the individual and the organization and how the impact on
people’s health and safety-related behavior.
The job (HSE, 1999) - Tasks should be designed in accordance with ergonomic5 principles
to take into account limitations and strengths in human performance. Matching the job to the
person will ensure that they are not overloaded and that the most effective contribution to the
business results. Physical match involves the individual’s information and decision-making re-
quirements, as well as their perception of the tasks and risks. Mismatches between job require-
ments and people’s capabilities provide the potential for human error.
The individual (HSE, 1999) - Tasks should be designed in accordance with ergonomic prin-
ciples to take into account limitations and strengths in human performance. Matching the job
to the persons will ensure that they are not overloaded and that the most effective contribution
to the business will be obtained. Physical match includes the design of the whole workplace
and working environment. Mental match involves the individuals information and decision-
making requirements, as well as their perception of the tasks and risks. Mismatches between
job requirements and peoples capabilities provide the potential for human error.
The organization (HSE, 1999) - Organizational factors have the greatest influence on individual
and group behaviour, yet they are often overlooked during the design of work and during inves-
tigation of accidents and incidents. Organisations need to establish their own positive health
5The applied science of equipment design, as for the workplace, intended to maximize productivity by reducing
operator fatigue and discomfort.
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and safety culture. The culture needs to promote employee involvement and commitment at all
levels, emphasising that deviation from established health and safety standards is not accept-
able.
Figure 2.13: Human factors in occupational health and safety (HSE, 1999)
Figure 2.13 highlights some of the key issues for each area. By thinking about these aspects
you are asking questions about:
1. What are people being asked to do and where (the task and its characteristics)?
2. Who is doing it (the individual and their competence)?
3. Where are they working (the organisation and its attributes)?
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HO factors in the HTO context
HO factors are a part of the human element in the HTO context presented above, and have over
the past two decades, gained grate attention in the oil and gas industry in Norway. OGP. con-
ducted a case study which resulted in the observation that by improving engineering, improving
health, safety and environmental management systems (HSEMS) and incorporation of HO fac-
tors, the rate of incidents decreased, see Figure 2.14. A better understanding of HO factors gives
Figure 2.14: Incident frequency in the Oil and Gas industry (OGP.).
a strong backbone in companies policies and procedures to be able to correctly identify what
causes human error and how to prevent future human errors. The HO factors play a major role
in causing and preventing accidents, since people design, manage, operate, maintain and de-
fend hazardous technologies (Reason, 1997). The objective of HO factors is to minimize human
errors, and the effects of human errors, and maximize the safety, and effectiveness of human
performance by making it hard to do things wrong and easy to do things right. HO factors also
play a major part in work performance and must be accounted for during design of system and
workplaces.
A definition of HO factors defined by HSE (1999) and others, is already presented earlier but
to get a better understanding of HO factors in relation to the HTO-concept can the HO factors
discipline defined by PSA be mentioned. Petroleum Safety Authority Norway. (2011) describes
the HO factors discipline as a systematic analytic tool which includes methods and knowledge
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that can be used to improve, evaluate and assess the HTO interactions. The focus is on the
human being and their interactions with tools, machines, procedures, environments and work-
place. Humans are both assets and liabilities in these different settings. According to Wong
(2002) maintenance, engineering and operations are human interfaces to be considered.
A number of serious accidents have highlighted failures in HTO- and HO factors aspects, and
maid it clear how important this aspects are to achieve a safe operation and high performance.
Barriers are a central concept to describe the preventive elements to prevent an accident from
occurring and reduce the impact (Petroleum Safety Authority Norway., 2011). A barrier consists
of one or more technical, operational, organizational or human components (based on specific
procedures or administrative controls) that is implemented to prevent, control, or imped en-
ergy releases from reaching the assets and causing harm (Rausand, 2011). Example of some
categories of barriers are listed in Table 2.4. All the defensive layers would in an ideal world be
intact, allowing no penetration by possible accidents trajectories (Reason, 1997). But sadly this
is not true in the real world. Every step in a process has the potential for failure, to varying de-
gree. Dormant errors in the work tasks and environments can be "moldering" under the surface
without causing damage (Wenner and Drury, 1997), these dormant errors can find opportuni-
ties for a process to fail or in other words, "holes" in the security barriers which can then lead to
error that can pass through all the safety barriers and cause accidents. To illustrate this, Reason
(1997) proposed what is referred to as the "Swiss Cheese Model" of system failure.
Table 2.4: Categories of barriers (Rausand, 2011).
Physical barriers: Administrative barriers: Management barriers:
- Equipment and engineering de-
sign
- Hazard identification and
analyses
- Training
- Personal protective equipment
(e.g., clothes, hard hats, glasses)
- Line management over-
sight
- Knowledge and skills
- Fire walls, shield - Supervision - Rules and Regula-
tions
- Safety devices (e.g., relief valves,
emergency shutdown systems, fire
extinguishers)
- Inspection and testing
- Warning devices (e.g., fire and
gas alarms)
- Work planning
- Work procedures
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The "Swiss cheese model"
The "Swiss cheese model" is a good illustration of how different layers, i.e. human, organiza-
tional and technical barriers, under a given set of conditions, can lead to hazards and potential
human, economical or material losses. An error may allow a problem to pass through a hole
in one layer, but in the next layer the holes are in different places, and the problem should be
caught, see Figure 2.15. Each layer is a defence against potential error impacting the outcome.
Figure 2.15: Reason’s "Swiss cheese model" whit a successful layer of defences, where "cheese
slices" illustrates defensive barriers (Reason, 1997).
For an accident to occur, the holes need to be aligned for each step in the process allowing
all the defensive barriers to be defeated, resulting in an accident. If all the layers are set up with
all the holes lined up, then this is a flawed system that will allow a problem at the beginning to
progress all the way through to adversely affects the outcome. Figure 2.16 illustrates a flawed
defence system. Barriers listed in 2.4 can be considered as "holes" leading to breach of the
organizational defences, barriers and safeguards leading to incidents, accidents or catastrophic
events.
The HO factor knowledge can help to better match people limitations, capabilities and needs
by improving elements such as tools and equipment and improve the environment in which
people uses these elements. It can also improve the efficiency (increased reliability/reduced
downtime), effectiveness, and productivity of systems and work environments. This will even-
tuality lead to fewer accidents, lower lifetime costs associated with the maintenance and re-
engineering of systems and a more productive workforce.
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Figure 2.16: Reason’s "Swiss cheese model" with a unsuccessful layer of defences, where "cheese
slices" illustrates defensive barriers (Reason, 1997).
Chapter 3
Classification for Human and
Organizational Factors
3.1 Introduction
Awareness of HO factors and human reliability has increased significantly over the last 15 to 20
years. Primarily as a result of major catastrophes that have had significant human error con-
tributions, e.g.Three Mile Island, Challenger space shuttle, Chernobyl. Each of these and other
incidents have identified different types of human errors and failings; some of which were not
generally recognized prior to the incident.
Due to the results of these events has it been widely recognized that more information about
human actions and errors is needed to improve safety and operation in all sorts of industry. For
a long time the Fault Assessment/Reliability world realized it needed data on component and
system failures and created schemes for collecting suitable data. Probabilistic Safety Assess-
ment1 (PRSA) studies have started to incorporate human actions and errors; PRSA specialists
are now demanding human reliability data to incorporate within PRSA models.
Analysis of human error data requires human error classification. As the human factors/ re-
liability subject has developed, so has the topic of human factor/error classification too. The
classifications vary considerably depending on whether it has been developed from a theoreti-
1The subject of PRSA will not be covered in this thesis. For more detail an the PRSA itself see Cox and Tait (1991)
and Green (1983)
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Figure 3.1: Contributing factors to human error (Garg et al., 2010)
cal psychological approach to understanding human behavior or error, or whether it has been
based on an empirical practical approach. This latter approach is often adopted by different
industries such as the oil and gas industry which is constantly in need of rapid alterations and
practical improvements.
This chapter will try to reach this thesis objective and identify classification schemes for HO
factors related to well integrity in the various phases of a well’s life. Through a detailed literary
survey (see Reason (1990); Kirwan (1994); Wilson and Stanton (2001); International Atomic En-
gergy agency. (1989)) no clear way of classifying HO factors have been identified, but a pattern
emerges. The author notice the pattern and believes therefore that the best way of classifying
HO factors is to classify human error. Little knowledge in this area of expertise presents a chal-
lenge: How can classifying human error be a way of classifying HO factors? Hopefully will Figure
3.1 blur the confusion and give the reader an idea of why this may be a way of classifying HO
factors. Figure 3.1 shows that classifying human errors will evidentially pinpoint contributing
factors such as HO factors (culture, organizational factors, training, etc.) that safety engineers
may be able to "fix". If the contributing factors is not fixed an incident then an accident may oc-
cur. This way of classification is therefore more suited for the industry since it highlights factors
that personnel may be able to improve and eliminate the possibility of an accident. Therefore
is the concept of human reliability assessment (HRA) presented because it involves the use of
qualitative and quantitative methods to asses the human contribution to risk. The general ob-
jectives and advantages of human error classification is then presented followed by different
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methods of classification. The recommended method best suited for answering the project task
number two of this thesis is then presented. I also like to mention that I am not a professional
and that I am "new to the game" as a student.
3.2 Human Reliability Assessment
Accidents are not usually caused by a single failure or mistake but by the confluence of a whole
series, or chain, of errors. In offshore operations, accidents are often initiated by errors induced
by technical failures, human and organizational factors or a combination of both.
HRA primary goals is to properly assessing the risks attributable to human error and for
ways of reducing system vulnerability. Therefore is HRA introduced as a subject in this section
to help define a set of useful tools for the analysis and help classifying HO factors/errors. This
will results in a reduction of those errors which could lead to system accidents.
To reduce the risk, a deep understanding of what can go wrong in the system needs to be
established, or in other words, the human errors in the system needs to be systematically iden-
tified and classified. Human and organizational errors refer to unacceptable or undesirable per-
formance on the part of an individual (human error) or a group (organizational error) that can
result in unanticipated or undesirable effects (US, Coast Guard, 2004).
To bee able to achieve the primary goals to the HRA, three principal functions must be
achived:
1. Human Error Identification (HEI): identifying what errors can occur.
2. Human Error Quantification (HEQ): deciding how likely the errors are to occur.
3. Human Error Reduction (HER): enhancing human reliability by reducing its error likeli-
hood.
HRA is inherently inter-disciplinary for two reasons. Firstly, it requires an appreciation of
the nature of human error, both in terms of its underlying psychological basis and mechanisms,
and in terms of the various HO factors, such as training and the design of the interface, affecting
performance. Secondly, it requires both some understanding of the engineering of the system,
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so that the intended and unintended human-system interactions can be explored for error po-
tential and error impact, and an appreciation of reliability- and risk-estimation methods, so that
HRA can be integrated into the ’risk picture’ associated with a system. This picture can then act
as a summary of the impacts of human error and hardware failure on system risk, and can be
used to decide which aspects of risk are most important.
Human error
The term human error has been pragmatically defined by Swain (1989) as follows: "any member
of a set of human actions or activities that exceeds some limit of acceptability, i.e. an out of
tolerance action [or failure to act] where the limits of performance are defined by the system".
The effects human error on system performance have been demonstrated most vividly be large-
scale accidents.
Human errors may cause accident but accident may not be caused purely by human errors.
In order to reduce casualties, safety analysts must first identify the type of human and organi-
zational errors that cause casualties and then study and determine how accidents happen. To
identify and classify HO factors are extremely difficult, because the type of human and organi-
zational errors varies. Even though this classification process is extremely difficult, the reward
of doing so is absolutely worth it. Human error is covered in more detailed in the book "huamn
error" written by Reason (1990).
3.3 Human Error Classification
There are many different human error classifications schemes, which helps to assist, analyse
human error and behavior. Hence which classification scheme to be use is dependent on the
objectives of the analyst.
A psychologist may be interested in understanding the psychological causes of a human er-
ror to compare with a theoretical model. A petroleum engineer will want to classify human
errors in a way that enables practical error reduction steps to be taken quickly. In both cases the
human error classification allows human error data to be handled and "root causes2" to be clas-
2The root cause of a specific failure is the most basic cause that, if corrected, would prevent recurrence of this
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sified. However, there is likely to be considerable variance on what each user as a "root cause".
The petroleum engineer may define root causes along a practical basis, e.g. deficient proce-
dures, lack of training. A psychologist may prefer to use "root causes" related to a theoretical
psychological model of human behaviour.
In all cases the human error classification is used to assist the analyst to achieve his or her
own objectives. As there can be many different objectives for analysing human behavior there
are many different means of human error classification. Regardless of all the different means
of human error classification has International Atomic Engergy agency. (1989) identified three
overall objectives:
1. to provide qualitative improvements to plant safety, i.e. identification of human error
problems and introduction of measures to reduce or prevent those human errors that are
related to safety;
2. to provide qualitative improvements to plant performance/availability, i.e. identification
of human error problems and introduction of measures to reduce or prevent those errors
that affect plant performance/availability;
3. to provide numerical data for use in PRSAs or other safety studies.
These overall objectives emphasize that this approach is well suited to classify HO factors as well
as quantify the influence these HO factors adds to the system.
3.4 Advantages of Classification
A better understanding of HO factors gives a strong backbone in companies policies and pro-
cedures to be able to correctly identify what causes human error and how to prevent future
human errors. The HO factors plays a major role in causing and preventing accidents, since
people design, manage, operate, maintain and defend hazardous technologies (Reason, 1997).
The objective of HO factors is to minimize human errors and the effects of human errors and
maximize the safety and effectiveness of human performance, by making it hard to do things
and similar failures
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wrong and easy to do things right. HO factors also play a major part in work performance and
must be accounted for during design of system and workplaces.
The classification of human errors is the backbone of HEI, its infrastructure and framework.
A classification itself is simply the partitioning of a group of phenomena (e.g. human behavior)
into categories or types (e.g error types) that are based upon a set of descriptions (e.g. omission,
commissions, etc.) which can be applied relatively reliably (e.g. by different assessors) to the
group of phenomena in question. The advantage of a classification is that without it the intel-
lectual process grinds to a halt, since what one person is talking or writing about is opaque to
any other person. It is difficult to describe, for example, the colour of a rose without using a
classification system (involving colour, hue, saturation, warmth, etc.); indeed, the word ’rose’ it
itself part of a rather large classification system or taxonomy
If a study wishes to use a human error datum to quantify a human error probability (HEP),
to show similarity in HEP, it will be proper to use either a particular datum or just any. Such
a discretion can only be made on the basis of a classification system. This point may seem
laborious, but it is a recurring theme throughout this and other sections. It is also fundamental
to any robust and scientific human reliability assessment. The advantages of a classification
scheme, or taxonomy, of human error are as follows:
Similarity, in HEP, if one wishes to use a human error datum to quantify a HEP, it is appro-
priate to use this particular datum or select another one instead. Such a judgement can only
strictly be made on the basis of a classification system. This point may seem laboured but it
is fundamental to any robust and scientific HRA. The advantages of a classification system, or
taxonomy, of human error are as follows:
• It offers a structure to the user, such that categories can be used ether predictively, to iden-
tify errors, or retrospectively, to classify events.
• If robust, it offers a mean of rendering HEI both reliable and repeatable, to the extent that
two independent assessors are able to identify the same errors.
• It can add meaning to the assessment by defining the causes and reasons underlying the
errors, and thus making the assessment more obvious.
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• It offers a means by which human error data can be collected and/or generated, matched
with identified human errors and the quantified predictively.
• In theory, a good classification system will at least enhance (and sometimes even guaran-
tee) the comprehensiveness of the error identification process, such that no critical errors
are omitted from the assessment.
As seen her is classification a worthwhile objective since it offers so many advantages, and
can make the process of error-identification less of a ’black box’ affair (Kirwan, 1994). However,
according to Kirwan (1994) are there two major pitfalls that has been identified and may cause
some concern:
• If the classification scheme is not complete, important error may be omitted from the
analysis.
• If the classification of errors is incorrect or superficial, critical difference in error typol-
ogy may be overlooked, leading later to an inappropriate and incorrect quantification of
human reliability
In practice we can now see that classification systems of human error are being used in three
main ways:
• For the analysis of incidents: to identify what happened and then prevent it’s recurrence;
as well as to derive data from such incidents.
• For HEI purposes: to identify errors which may have an impact upon a system’s goals, as
well as the level of inherent risk.
• HEQ: to match existing data to identified human errors in order to quantify the likelihood
of the latters’ occurrence.
Having briefly outlined the importance and rationale of a classification, plus its objectives,
advantages and limitations, it is now appropriate to consider some of the basic classification
methods related to well integrity.
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Table 3.1: Methods/Tools well suited for well integrity assessment
Method/Tool In full
WHW questions What, How and Why questions
General methods SRK Skill-, Rule-, and Knowledge-Based Behavior
SLMV Slips, Lapses, Mistakes, and Violations
THERP Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction
Advanced methods STEPP Sequential Time Event Plotting Procedure
3.5 Classification Methods
There is no universal agreed classification scheme for human error, nor is there on in prospect.
A scheme is usually made for a specific purpose, and no single scheme is likely to satisfy all
needs. Nearly everyone who has published in this field has devised some form of error classifi-
cation scheme. Consequently, the literature abundance with such schemes, reflecting a variety
of practical concerns and theoretical orientations and ranging from the highly task specific to
broad statement of underlying error tendencies.
A total of 72 potential human reliability related tools and acronyms were identified by (Health
and Safety Executive, 2009). After reeding the details of these 72 methods, 35 was identified as
potentially relevant for classification purposes. Table 3.2 shows the acronym and full title of all
the 35 tools identified for review. Through a high level assessment of the available information,
HSE considerer 17 of these methods to be of potential use to major hazards directorates. These
17 methods is listed in Table 3.3.
As shown in the Table 3.3 are there many different classification schemes that can be used
to classify human and organizational factors. It is impotent do notice that most of this methods
are developed for the nuclear and aviation industry and is therefore not well suited for the oil
and gas industry. Most of the methods is therefore not covered in more detail in this thesis. The
authors goal by listing all of this methods is to give the reader an insight in the huge specialized
field of human and organizational factors. A summery of all the methods identified as being
of potential use to HSE major hazardous identification can be found at HSE’s websites listed in
the Bibliography (Health and Safety Executive, 2009). Table 3.1 shows methods identified by the
author that is well suited for the oil and gas industry. The methods listed in Table 3.1 will be
covered in more detail.
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Table 3.2: Acronym and full title of the 35 tools identified for review (Health and Safety Executive,
2009)
Method/Tool In full
ASEP Accident Sequence Evaluation Programme
AIPA Accident Initiation and Progression Analysis
APJ Absolute Probability Judgement
ATHEANA A Technique for Human Error Analysis
CAHR Connectionism Assessment of Human Reliability
CARA Controller Action Reliability Assessment
CES Cognitive Environmental Simulation
CESA Commission Errors Search and Assessment
CM Confusion Matrix
CODA Conclusions from occurrences by descriptions of actions
COGENT COGnitive EveNt Tree
COSIMO Cognitive Simulation Model
CREAM Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method
DNE Direct Numerical Estimation
DREAMS Dynamic Reliability Technique for Error Assessment in Man-machine Sys-
tems
FACE Framework for Analysing Commission Errors
HCR Human Cognitive Reliability
HEART Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique
HORAAM Human and Organizational Reliability Analysis in Accident Management
HRMS Human Reliability Management System
INTENT Not an acronym
JHEDI Justified Human Error Data Information
MAPPS Maintenance Personnel Performance Simulation
MERMOS Method d’Evaluation de la Realisation des Missions Operateur pour la
Surete (Assessment method for the performance of safety operation.)
NARA Nuclear Action Reliability Assessment
OATS Operator Action Tree System
OHPRA Operational Human Performance Reliability Analysis
PC Paired comparisons
PHRA Probabilistic Human Reliability Assessment
SHARP Systematic Human Action Reliability Procedure
SLIM-MAUD Success likelihood index methodology, multi-attribute utility decomposi-
tion
SPAR-H Simplified Plant Analysis Risk Human Reliability Assessment
STAHR Socio-Technical Assessment of Human Reliability
TESEO Tecnica empirica stima errori operatori (Empirical technique to estimate
operator errors)
THERP Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction
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Table 3.3: A list of the 17 tools considered to be of potential use to HSE major hazard directorates
(Health and Safety Executive, 2009)
Method/Tool Comment Domain
THERP A comprehensive HRA approach developed for the US-
NRC
Nuclear
with wider
applica-
tion
ASEP A shortened verson of THERP developed for the USNRC Nuclear
1s
tg
en
er
at
io
n
HEART Relatively quick apply and understood by engineers and
human factors specialists. The method is avaiable vie
published research papers. (A manual is avaiable vie
British Energy)
Generic
P
u
b
li
cl
y
av
ai
la
b
le
SPAR-H Useful approach for situations where a detailed assess-
ment is not necessary. Developed for the USNRC1 Based
on Heart
Nuclear
with wider
applica-
tion
ATHEANA Resource intensive and would benefit from further devel-
opment. Developed by the USNRC1
Nuclear
with wider
applica-
tion
2n
d
ge
n
er
at
io
n
CREAM Requires further development. Available in a number of
published references.
Nuclear
with wider
applica-
tions
APJ Requires tight controls to minimise bias, otherwise valid-
ity may be questionable. Viewed by some as more valid
that PC and SLIM.
Generic
PC Requires tight controls to minimise bias, otherwise valid-
ity may be questionable
Generic
E
xp
er
tJ
u
d
ge
m
en
t
SLIM-MAUD Requires tight controls to minimise bias of SLIM element,
otherwise validity can be questionable. The SLIM ele-
ment is publicly available.
Nuclear
with wider
applica-
tion
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Method/Tool Comment Domain
HRMS Comprehensive computerised tool. A roprietary method Nuclear
JHEDI Faster screening technique than HRMS, its parent toll. A
proprietary method
Nuclear
1s
tg
en
er
at
io
n
INTENT Narrow focus on erors of intention. Little evidence of use
but potentially useful- Available by contacting HSE.
Nuclear
CAHR A database method that is potentially useful. Available by
contacting the authors (CAHR website).
Generic
N
o
tp
u
b
lic
ly
av
ai
la
b
le
CESA Potentially useful. Available by contacting the HSE Nuclear
2n
d
ge
n
er
at
io
n
CODA Requires further development and CAHR or CESA may be
more useful. Available by contacting the HSE.
Nuclear
MERMOS Developed and used by EdF3 its development is ongoing.
A proprietary tool.
Nuclear
3rd generation
NARA A nuclear specific version of HEART (different author to
the original). A proprietary tool.
Nuclear
3.5.1 What, How and Why (WHW) questions
There exist several different classifications schemes of human error by using knowledge of hu-
man cognitive behavior. Most classifications have multiple levels of analysis, such as what hap-
pened, how it happened and why did it happened. Asking these questions is a very general way
to classify human error, and can be a tool for practical application of acquired knowledge and to
increase competence. There are three categories of taxonomy that can help to study and analyse
the nature and extent of human error (Redmill and Rajan, 1997):
1. Phenomenological taxonomy (What happened?): describes the error in superficial terms
that refer to observable events, and are widely used in HRA. Substitutions, repetitions and
omissions are typical categories.
2. Cognitive mechanism taxonomies (How did it happen?): classify errors in the stages of
human information processing, and are increasingly used in post-accident investigations.
Memory lapses, misinterpretation, mistake alternatives, attention errors and perceptual
errors are such examples.
3. Taxonomies for bias and deep-rooted tendencies (Why did it happen?): that error is be-
lieved to reveal, and currently tends to be research tools. The classification at this level
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of the performance error-shaping factors can be done by using Skill- Rule and Knowledge
based behavior theory.
By asking WHW questions, can one learn from, analyse and study human error and acci-
dents that have occurred in a complex work systems. Thereby, one could improve the perfor-
mance, procedures, rules, reliability and behavior. One can eliminate, reduce and control the
errors in situations that are safety critical. The questions can also provide input to a HRA and
can be used for post-accident investigations and research (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). This gives
the opportunity to improve the technical system design and operations, and provide input to
risk and safety analysis. Organizational design, management and planning can also apply this
knowledge (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). This shows a wide range of factors that can utilize the re-
sults from the WHW questions for improvement, learning, control and increased security. The
importance of these questions addresses how the use of knowledge will contribute to a safe and
improved performance and operation of complex work systems where humans are involved.
3.5.2 Skill-, Rule-, and Knowledge-Based Behavior
One of the most influential methods for classifying HO factors/behavior is the skill-, rule-, and
knowledge- based behavior (SKR) method of Rasmussen (1983). Basically, the three levels rep-
resents the following types of behavior:
Skill-based: Sensory-motor performance which take place without conscious control. Rou-
tine and highly practices tasks are carried out in a highly automatic fashion with occasional
conscious checks on progress (Rasmussen, 1983). The person may be unable to describe how
they control and on what information they pass the performance through the highly integrated
smooth automated patterns of behavior (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). At the skill-based level the
information from the environment is perceived as signals. Here, slips and lapses are types of
errors that may occur when a skilled person are performing a familiar task
Rule-based: Actions according to an explicit rule or procedure (Rausand, 2011). Rule-based be-
havior is when the operator does not have the same level of practice as for skill-based behavior
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when performing a task. The procedure may not have been carried out in the proper sequence,
or some hesitation in recalling the procedure, or some steps may not be performed precisely.
Rule-based errors are often concerned with the misapplication or inappropriate use of problem
solving rules (Rausand, 2011).
Knowledge-based: Coping with unfamiliar situations without a procedure (e.g., diagnosis) re-
quires conscious problem solving and decision-making. Knowledge-based behavior includes
situations where the operator needs to contemplate the situation, interpret information, or
make a difficult decision (Rausand, 2011).
Application of the SRK-bahavior method
The SRK method contribute to integrate and coordinate organizational design, system safety
and HO factors by classifying human errors. The SRK method shows the main distinctions be-
tween tree levels of human performance (Reason, 1997). These performance levels are distin-
guished by psychological and situational variables that together define an "activity space" where
the tree performance levels can be classified (Reason, 1997). The performance levels can coex-
ist at the same time. Figure 3.2 show that humans can control their actions through various
combinations of two control modes - conscious (paying attention to something) an automatic
(largely unconscious) (Reason, 1997). It also illustrates the second dimension defining the "ac-
tivity space" of the situation, where the two extremes are highly familiar everyday situations and
routines, and entirely novel problems.
3.5.3 Slips, Lapses, Mistakes, and Violations.
Reason (1990) classified errors in terms of slips, lapses, mistakes, and violations. The terms has
been defined in terms that is easy to understand by Rausand (2011) and is therefore directly
quoted:
1. Slip: An action that is carried out with a correct intention but a faulty execution (Rausand,
2011). A slip is an action that is unplanned and usually is not a very dangerous event (e.g.,
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Figure 3.2: Location of the three performance levels within the "activity space" defined by con-
trol modes and situations (Reason, 1997).
inadvertently pushing the wrong button, reading error, slip of the tongue4).
2. Lapse: A failure to execute an action due to a lapse of memory or because of a distraction
(Rausand, 2011). A lapse may not necessarily be evident to anyone other than the person
who experienced the lapse. Lapses may be dangerous and are difficult to contain (e.g.,
omitting a step in a sequence of actions, "jumping" from one sequence to another, more
familiar, sequence of actions). Slips and lapses will usually not be eliminated by training
and need to be designed out (HSE., 2005).
3. Mistake: A correct execution of an incorrect intention. An operator may believe an action
to be correct when it is, in fact, wrong. He/she may, for example, press the wrong button
or switch off the wrong engine. Mistakes often appear in situations where the behavior
is based on remembered rules or familiar procedures and are generally more dangerous
than slips and lapses. Training is important to avoid mistakes.
4. Violation: A person deliberately applies a rule or procedure that is different from what
he/she knows is required, even though he/she may often do it with good intent. A familiar
rule violation is when someone knowingly drives his/her car above the speed limit. Viola-
4Note that such errors may be non-critical slips in some contexts and critical errors in other contexts
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tions differs form slips, lapses, and mistakes because the are deliberate, or illegal actions
(e.g., deliberately failing to follow procedures).
Slips and lapses is experienced by all, even experienced or highly motivated people, while
mistakes often are caused by lack of experience or inadequate training. Violations may range
from simple "corner-cutting" to dangerous macho behavior, and may be classified as (HSE.,
2005):
1. Routine violations: Behavior in opposition to rule, procedure, or instruction that has be-
come the normal way of behaving within the current context.
2. Exceptional violations: These are rare and happen only in unusual and particular circum-
stances, when something goes wrong in unpredicted circumstances: for example, during
an emergency situation.
3. Situational violations: These violations occur as a result of factors dictated by the worker’s
immediate workspace or environment (physical or organizational).
4. Acts of sabotage: These are self-explanatory, although the causes are complex, ranging
from vandalism by a demotivated emloyee to terrorism.
3.6 Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP)
This technique is one of the most widely used in a HRA for PRSA The object of THERP is: "to
predict HEP and to evaluate the degradation of a man-machine system likely to be caused by
human errors alone or in connection with equipment functioning, operational procedures and
practices, or other system and human characteristics that influence system behavior"(Swain
and Guttermann, 1983). The method consist of four procedural stages (Reason, 1990):
1. Identify the system functions that may be influenced by human error.
2. List and analyse the related human operations (i.e., perform a detailed task analysis5)
5Task analysis: Detailed examination of the observable activities associated with the execution of a required task
or piece of work (Rausand, 2011). For more detail on task analysis see Drury (1983); Kirwan and Ainsworth (1992)
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3. Estimate the relevant error probabilities using a combination of expert judgement and
available data.
4. Estimate the effect of human errors on the system failure events, a step that usually in-
volves the integration of HRA with probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). When used by de-
signers, it has an additional iterative step that involves making changes to the system and
then recalculating the probabilities in order to gauge the effects of these modification.
The method is best used with a systematic task-behaviour taxonomy, such as the system
developed by Berliner et al. (1964) and shown in Kirwan (1994). The THERP is well suited for
pre-accident and post-accident tasks. The method is old: its origins go back to the early 1960s.
The method is clearly described in the Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Empha-
sis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications (Swain and Guttermann, 1983). Section in the THERP
handbook (Swain and Guttermann, 1983) elaborates different types of problem which can occur
in a range of behaviour situation. These sections essentially imbue the reader with a fair variety
of human factors perceptions on good and poor task and interface designs (Kirwan, 1994). In
addition, the THERP methodology considers a range of PIFs which can give rise to human error.
Lastly, the human error data tables themselves found in Chapter 20 of the THERP handbook.
The value given in these 27 tables of HEPs relates to nominal HEPs (the probability that when a
given task element is performed, an error will occur).
By performing a task analysis of the human activities, the more likely errors can be detected
and their probabilities estimated. The influence of a wide variety of PIFs is taken into account.
The level of detail of data needed is extensive. The general areas of information required for this
technique are (International Atomic Engergy agency., 1989):
• Type of task
• Recovery factors
• Dependency
• Stress
• Type of equipment
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• Staffing and experience
• Management and administrative control
• diagnosis time oral and written procedures
• Other parameters related to man-machine interface: displays etc.
According to Kirwan (1994) are the disadvantages of this methodology its lack of rigorous struc-
ture. This means that there can be a considerable variation in how different assessors model
scenarios (see Brune et al. (1983)) and its failure to consider underlying psychological mecha-
nisms i.e. the reasons why errors occur. Its principal advantage is that it is straightforward and
simple to use, and has the potential to model all the errors that can affect a system.
3.7 Sequential Time Event Plotting Procedure (STEPP)
STEPP learns lessons from the past. It is a multiple event sequence technique used to struc-
ture incident investigation and accident analysis procedures by piecing together the scenarios
surrounding the accident or incident (Wilson and Stanton, 2001). The method distinguishes be-
tween events, actions, plant and people. The main purpose is to identify the causal paths and
the multi-causality of the incident or accident under investigation (Wilson and Stanton, 2001).
The model strives to identify and classify the underlying root causes rather than the obvious
superficial events. This means that this model is an ideal method for classifying HO factors.
Data needed for the development of the model is collected through interviews with team mem-
bers, data form measured variables, live and recoded transcripts, eyewitness testimony, print-
outs from alarm lists, etc.
The first stage in STEPP involves the definition of the "beginning" and "end" states of the
accident. This limits the scope of the investigation form the first event that deviated from the
planned technical process to the last harmful event in the incident (Kontogiannis et al., 1999).
The main events/actions that contributed to the accident is now to be identified followed by
the construction of the "event building blocks" which contain the following information (Kon-
togiannis et al., 1999):
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• the time at which the event/action started
• the duration of the event/action
• the agent which caused the event or action
• the description of the event/action
• the name of the source which offered this information
In the second stage, the events/actions are inter-connected with lines. All events should
have incoming and outgoing lines which shows "precede" and "follow" relationships between
events (Kontogiannis et al., 1999). According to Hendrick and Brenner (1987) can the finished
graph be several feet long. Lines (causal paths) closing in on each other shows dependencies
between events while lines moving away form each other show the impact on following events.
Some paths may be dead ends, others may lead to a single event and some paths may lead to
many events. When all the paths has been identified, the underlying root causes for the incident
are sought. At this stage the build up of latent or active causes and their effects can be identified
(Hendrick and Brenner, 1987).
At the end of the data collection, a multi-linear sequence diagram shows the personnel and
plant down the vertical axis with the time-line on the horizontal axis (Wilson and Stanton, 2001).
The accuracy of the event representation is checked using the backSTEPP technique. This
technique is simply reasoning backwards in order to examine how each "event building block"
could be made to occur. Reasoning backwards helps analysts to identify other ways in which
the accident process could have occurred, and this guides the search for additional data (Kon-
togiannis et al., 1999).
3.8 Recommendation
This chapter shows that there are many different ways of classifying HO factors. The WHW, SRK
and SLMV methods undertaken in this thesis were of an general nature and may have trouble
fulfilling the objectives of the analysis in regards of well integrity. THERP is a strong and efficient
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method for classifying HO factors. The method is well proven in many industries, specially the
nuclear and aviation industry, but is somewhat behind in the oil and gas industry.
The STEPP method is well suited to describe tractable systems, where it is possible to com-
pletely describe the system, the principles of functioning are known and there is sufficient knowl-
edge of key parameter. This means that the method is well suited for classifying an optimizing
HO factors in the oil and gas industry. Earlier studies on major accidents such as the Piper Al-
pha incident confirms that the STEPP method is well suited to analyse, classify and optimize
human and organizational factors in the context of well integrity. The method works well by
integrating and combine human factors methodology, giving a very comprehensive analysis of
human errors (Wilson and Stanton, 2001). The method looks at different aspects of work related
behavior, measuring and assessing the potential risks from human errors in that field. In prac-
tical terms, this method should ensure that safety margins are maintained and safety cases can
be made before changes in working practices are introduced. STEPP examine different aspect
of human interaction within the work environment and work related performance and subse-
quently measure and assess the likelihood of human errors, or potential human errors in that
interaction. This means that STEPP also is well suited for quantifying the influences of HO fac-
tors.
With all this taken into consideration together with discussions with the drilling supervisor
at Veslefrikk, is the method selected to be best suited to reach this thesis project task number
two, the STEPP method.
Chapter 4
Well Integrity: The relationship between
Human and Organizational factor and Well
Integrity
4.1 Introduction
During investigations of major accidents over the last few years it has become clear that there
is a lack of focus on the interaction factors between human, technology and organization ele-
ments in the oil and gas industry. These critical influencing factors or HO factors may be hard
to detect unless all possible interactions between the different elements is considered. Unfore-
seen critical factor may have a critical influence on the work performance by the operators and
crews, and may have a bad influence on well integrity.
Well integrity is an issue affecting the entire life cycle of a well to prevent uncontrolled re-
lease of formation fluids through technical, operational, and organizational barriers (Standar
Norway., 2004). This thesis shows that there are different ways of looking at these factors af-
fecting the decision making and work performance (the human performance model, the error
causation paradigm, HTO and PIFs). It illuminates that these methods can be useful to identify,
evaluate and analyse the HTO perspective. A strong knowledge of the systems from an HTO
perspective, together with a classification scheme for HO factors and further analysis with re-
spect to dynamic connections between the personnel, the activity, and the context (the human
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performance model) can give a better working environment and an opportunity to improve the
health, safety integrity, and work performance (Vignes, 2011). Comprehending the interactions
between HTO, the human error causation paradigm and the knowledge about PIFs may be crit-
ical for achieve the goals of safe and effective well operations (Redmill and Rajan, 1997).
This chapter will provide an introduction to well integrity, then try to reach these thesis
project tasks number three and four. The HTO perspective will be used to introduce the HO
factors in the context of well integrity and a presentation of why HO factors is of importance in
the context of well integrity will be given. The HTO perspective will be used as an analytic tool to
analyse, evaluate and improve the interactions between human, technology and organizational
elements and thereby improving well integrity.
4.2 Well Integrity
4.2.1 What is well integrity
Today the operational phase of a well’s life can last for 30 years or more. Wells are being drilled
deeper, longer and under more challenging conditions than ever before. This makes it more
difficult to manage the well and ensure optimum safe conditions for the whole well designed
life. This leads to the concept of well integrity.
Several well incidents have been reported in the past, with significant impact and potential
for serious accidents. This could typically be a result from ageing effects or wrong design, un-
clear understanding of barriers, weaknesses in well design and planning processes, insufficient
validation of premises, well conversion and other reasons. All of this categories of failure rang-
ing from the design stage, all the way to the abandonment phase can be put under one category,
well integrity.
Well integrity can in its simplest definition be defined as a condition of a well in operation
that has full functionality and two qualified well barrier envelopes (Sangesland et al., 2012). Any
deviation from this state is a minor or major well integrity issue.
The definition emphasizes the importance of technical and technological solutions to avoid
flow of formation fluids from one formation zone to another, or to the surface throughout the
CHAPTER 4. CONNECTION BETWEENHO FACTORS ANDWELL INTEGRITY 63
life cycle of a well. According to Sangesland et al. (2012), well integrity is not only influenced by
equipment robustness, but by the total process, resources and competence of the organization
and individual.
This definition is all well and good but in an international industry such as the Oil and Gas
industry, there is need for a global understanding of what well integrity is and how to manage it.
Therefore different authorities have made standards and regulations to ensure adequate safety,
value adding and cost effectiveness for the petroleum industry developments and operations.
Well integrity is defined in Norsok-D-010 as: "application of technical, operational and or-
ganizational solutions to reduce risk of uncontrolled release of formation fluids throughout the
life cycle of a well".
Norsok D-010 is a functional standard which means that it is the companies that have the full
responsibility to comply with the standard. The standard only gives the minimum requirements
for the equipments/solutions to be used in a well, but leaves it up to the operating companies
to choose the solutions that meet the requirements.
The standard focuses on establishing Well Barriers by the use of Well barrier element (WBE),
their acceptance criteria and their use and monitoring of integrity during their life cycle. Well
barriers is defined in Norsok D-010 as envelopes of one or several dependent Well Barrier El-
ements preventing fluids or gases from flowing unintentionally from the formation, into an-
other formation or to surface and are used to prevent leakages and reduce risk associated whith
drilling, production and intervention activities. The main objective of a well barrier is to (Stan-
dar Norway., 2004):
• Prevent any major hydrocarbon leakage from the well to the external environment during
normal production or well operations.
• Shut in the well on direct command during an emergency shutdown situation and thereby
prevent hydrocarbons from flowing from the well.
NORSOK D-010 distinguishes between primary and secondary well barriers. A primary well
barrier is the barrier that is closest to the pressurized hydrocarbons. If the primary well barrier
is functioning as intended, it will be able to contain the pressurized hydrocarbons. If the primary
well barrier fails, e.g. any leakage or a valve has failed to close, the secondary barrier will prevent
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outflow from the well. If the secondary well barrier fails, there may, or may not, be a tertiary
barrier available that can stop the flow of hydrocarbons (Sangesland et al., 2012). The standard
also covers well integrity management and personnel competence requirements. The standard
does not contain any well rig equipment specifications.
When Analyzing well barriers and their role in preventing or acting upon leakages it is im-
portant to understand the barrier function and the possible ways the barrier can fail. Methods
used to illustrate this is distinguish between:
• Well barrier schematics
• Barrier diagrams
Well barrier schematics and well barrier diagrams is an essential tool for assessment of the reli-
ability and risk in all the phases in the wells life cycle. This also applies for well integrity assess-
ments.
Well barrier schematics
A well barrier schematic (WBS) is shown for a standard production well in Figure 4.1 This well
has six primary well barrier elements:
• Formation /cap rock above reservoir
• Casing cement
• Casing
• Production packer
• Completion string (below the DHSV)
• Surface controlled subsurface safety valve (DHSV)
- And six secondary well barrier elements:
• Formation above production packer
• Casing cement
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Figure 4.1: Primary and secondary barriers in production and drilling mode (Standar Norway.,
2004)
• Casing with seal assembly
• Wellhead
• Tubing hanger with seals
• Annulus access line and valve
• Production tree (X-mas tree) with X-mas tree connection
According to NORSOK D-010, well barrier schematics are developed as a practical method to be
used to demonstrate and illustrate the presence, or non-presence of the required primary and
secondary well barriers. An example of a well barrier schematic of a production well is shown in
Figure 4.1. This is a template typically used for illustrating the well barrier schematic. In the real
barrier schematic for a specific well all the data are given (Sangesland et al., 2012)
The different colors represent the different well barriers according to NORSOK D-010. The
blue lines represents the primary well barrier and illustrates the "normal working stage, which
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for some situations is the fluid column or a mechanical well barrier that provides closure of the
well barrier envelope"(NORSOK D-010) and the red line represent the secondary well barrier
and illustrates the "ultimate stage, which in most cases describes a situation where the shear
ram/shear valve is closed" (NORSOK D-010). Well barrier schematics shall be complemented
by tables showing the WBEs that are found as primary or secondary barriers.
The schematic presents a well shut in and capable to produce. The blue line indicates the
primary barriers: production packer, completion string (tubing section between the downhole
safety valve and production packer), and the valve itself. The red line envelope consists of the
casing cement, casing, wellhead, tubing hanger, annulus master valve and production tree with
the production master valves.
4.2.2 What is the problem with Well Integrity?
Many different types of failures can lead to loss of well integrity. A typical well is built from thou-
sand of components that must withstand the stress from demanding environments. If this is not
fulfilled the conditions for well integrity is compromised and the well are at risk of damaging the
environment, personnel, etc. In the worst case even a blowout can occur.
This task is not easy and as we can see from the examples listed earlier the problem still exists
today. Managing well integrity is a global challenge and statistic collected during the past few
years from 3 independent sources (Forum North Sea Well Integrity., 2009) revealed well integrity
failures in 45%, 34% and 18% of wells in Gulf of Mexico, UK North Sea and the Norwegian North
Sea.
In 2006 the PSA conducted a well integrity survey that indicated about 20 % of wells in the
NCS may suffer from integrity issues. Most of the problems were related to deficiency in annulus
safety valve, tubing, cement and casing. Pressure build-up in annulus, i.e. sustained casing
pressure, is one of the main indicators of a significant well integrity problem (see Figure 4.2)
(Vignes et al., 2006)
Well Integrity is maintained by applying technical, operational, and organizational solutions
to reduce the risk of uncontrolled release of formation fluids throughout the life cycle of the well.
In the life cycle of an oil/gas well there is four phases the well goes through. Two of them are
important for the integrity of the sealant of the well, namely: The well construction phase and
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Figure 4.2: Number of wells suffering from different barrier element failure. (Vignes and Aadnoy,
2008)
the production phase.
• Design Stage: This involves exploration activities before actual wellbore operations begin.
• Well construction phase:
– Drilling
– Cementing
– Completing During this phase, the stresses and resultant wellbore stability will con-
stantly change because the fluctuating gravity of the fluids inside the wellbore. These
changes will influence the resultant stresses in the cement sheath
• Later operational phase During this phase, the intended operational regime of the well and
planned/unplanned human interventions will seriously affect the integrity of the sealant.
Typical Actions that happens during this phase:
– Naturally developing stresses, subsidence, depletion
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– Operational Regime Moderate versus HPHT operation Water/steam injector/gas stor-
age/production
– Human interventions Changing fluids Pressure testing Perforation Injection Produc-
tion Propped hydraulic or acid fracturing Hot oiling Sidetracking operations
• Abandonment phase: this stage involves plugging and abandoning wells which have reached
its economic life.
Ideally, during the draft of the Well Functional Specifications, the extremes in well opera-
tion should be defined. Next, the impact, not only on casing or tubing design, but also on
the integrity of the well sealant should be evaluated.
4.2.3 What are the requirements to Well Integrity?
As we now have seen, well integrity is a big subject and involves a lot of different departments
and components. According to (Noland, 2012), to serve up a well with integrity, follow this
recipe:
• Planning - No such thing as too much planning
• Ingredients - One bad ingredient can spoil the well
• Team - A coordinated broad based team effort is essential
• Technique and Execution - Plans and guidelines must be fit for purpose and followed - no
shortcuts
• Sample - Ensure key well parameters are met along the way
This recipe refers to the underlying cause of the failure both in terms of management but also
in terms of component failure and is very important to manage in a correct way. But the well
integrity requirements refers mostly to the well Barriers and well elements. This is because the
technical means of avoiding well integrity loss are the use of well barriers. NORSOK D-0101
specifies that: "There shall be two well barriers available during all well activities and operations,
including suspended or abandoned wells and keep the borehole/well to the external environ-
ment". This sets the foundation for how to operate wells and keep the wells safe in all phases
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of the development. This requirement is also referred to in PSA’s Activities and Facilities regula-
tion and it implies that operators have to adhere to the two barrier philosophies and maintain
sufficient adherence in all phases of their operations.
Well barriers are mandatory to provide well integrity. Well barriers are used to prevent leak-
ages and reduce the risk associated with drilling, production and intervention activities. Standar
Norway. (2004) defines Well barrier as a envelope of one or several dependent barrier elements
preventing fluids or gases from flowing unintentionally from the formation into another forma-
tion or to the surface. The objectives or the requirements the well barriers must maintain are:
• Prevent any major hydrocarbon leakage from the well to the external environment during
normal production or well operations.
• Shut in the well on direct command during an emergency shutdown situation and thereby
prevent hydrocarbons from flowing from the well.
Well barrier consist of on or more well barrier elements. Well barrier elements are defined in the
Standar Norway. (2004) as Object that alone cannot prevent flow from one side to the other side
of itself.
Requirements that apply to barriers needs to be distinguish in general (e.g., as stated in PSA’s
Management Regulations, §4 and §5), and requirements that apply to well barriers in particular
(e.g., as stated in PSA’s Facilities Regulations, §48). The associated guidelines provide further
details and give reference to specific parts of national or international standards. The guideline
to §48 of the Facilities Regulations, for example, refers to specific chapters of the NORSOK D-010
standard and also to specific sections of the Management Regulations.
From the guidelines to §48 of the Facilities Regulations, and the referenced standards, the
following requirements can be deduced:
• At least two independent and tested barriers shall, as a rule, be available in order to pre-
vent an intentional flow from the well during drilling and well activities.
• The barriers shall be designed so as to enable rapid re-establishment of a lost barrier.
• In the event of a barrier failure, immediate measures shall be taken in order to maintain
an adequate safety level until at least two independent barriers have been restored. No
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activities for any other purposes than re-establishing two barriers shall be carried out in
the well.
• The barriers shall be defined and criteria for (what is defined as a) failure shall be deter-
mined.
• The position/status of the barriers shall be known at all times.
• It shall be possible to test well barriers. Testing methods and intervals shall be determined.
To the extent possible, the barriers shall be tested in the direction of flow.
• Separate regulations are issued by the PSA for handling of shallow gas in drilling operation.
When drilling the tophole section, the gas diversion possibility is regarded as the second
barrier. This is, however, not a barrier according to the barrier definition above.
4.2.4 Improvement Potential
There is a common denominator between many of the failures experienced on wells and their
well integrity :
• Operational decisions during abnormal situations often leads to well failures.
• Design issues such as long-term effects are not sufficiently considered.
• The challenge is to account for rare events that may lead to major incidents. The normal
approach is to focus on frequent and low-consequence incidents.
PSA (Vignes et al., 2006) proposed several improvements to try to make well integrity as safe as
possible:
• Well Documentation. Different approaches for transfer of well-barrier responsibilities
and insufficient transfer of critical information during operations and license acquisitions
may result in reduced barrier control. Improved and user-friendly access and visualiza-
tion of key well information are needed.
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• Handover Documentation. Several companies include pressure-test-verification charts
in their handover documentation without interpretation. These data could be several
years old and do not necessarily represent the present status. Well-integrity or well-barrier
schematic illustrations, verifications, and how-to-monitor status were not easily accessi-
ble. While completion schematics are included in the handover documentation and kept
updated at all times, the barrier schematic illustrations with descriptions were often inad-
equate.
• Condition Monitoring. Consideration to and evaluations of initial casing design for the
lifetime of the well and possible changes o the well usage (example, from production to
injection) and also difficult to obtain.
• Comments Related to NORSOK D-010 Compliance. The NORSOK D-010 defines require-
ments and guidelines, including the established well-barrier philosophy. It appears to
be less known and adhered to than PSA expected at the time when the audits were con-
ducted. The lack of information on well names, dates, and revision numbers complicates
easy overview of the status on well barriers. Color coding and descriptions of the barrier
envelopes vary from company to company, but also within the same company. In sev-
eral cases, the barrier illustrations do not contain details of perforations, the X-mas tree,
and cement presence, and in some cases they lack barrier elements. Such well details with
possible inclusion of dimensions and depth data should be included for updated versions.
Verification details of the casing cement barriers are often lacking. Hence, proper planned
top of cement (TOC), packer-setting depth, and later proper zonal isolation for later P and
A Could imply uncertainties.
• Competence and Training. The questionnaire revealed a need for strengthening knowl-
edge, communication, and requirements to well barriers and status. The companies gen-
erally expressed high interest in sharing and exchanging training material for practical
use.
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4.2.5 What remains to be done within Well Integrity?
Well integrity has come a long way to become an efficient and reliable tool to prevent accidents.
But sadly accidents do happen and will continue happening in the future if the industry contin-
ues with it’s philosophy and trends. To turn this development in the future the industry needs to
change attitude to increase the focus on barrier issues. By changing the focus on to barrier status
and the control of barrier status the company has a good chance of limiting any unintentional
leaks, well-control situations, and accidents. This important HSE factor give the companies a
"well-known" barrier status that enables them to take the right actions in a proactive manner
and thereby prevent potential losses and expenses.
According to the Well-integrity survey by PSA (Vignes et al., 2006) 7% of the wells were shut-
in because of integrity failures/issues or uncertainty, 9% of he wells were working under condi-
tions/exemptions and 2% of the wells had insignificant deviations for current operation. This
means that there is a lot of improvement potential in well integrity.
Well integrity is a complex system that consists of WBE such as tubing, ASV and casing but
can also be referred to as the management around all of these components. Therefore, it is
important to understand the improvement can not only be focused on the components itself
but also the management around the components. Therefore the PSA encourage the industry
to the following:
• Improve systems of reliability and condition-based surveillance for well barriers and well-
integrity aspects to improve well safety.
• Provide better visualization of barriers for both onshore and offshore users to improve the
safety level and user friendliness.
• Agree on standard ways of visualization, technical qualification, documentation, and ab-
breviations.
• Consider developing a standard handover package containing basic well-engineering data
required to give a full overview of the well-barrier situation from spud to abandonment.
• The industry needs to further develop and acquire suitable technology for condition mon-
itoring of wells to improve on systematic and preventive maintenance and to keep better
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control on degradation mechanisms.
• Improved attention on verification and condition monitoring of well barriers and well in-
tegrity is needed.
• Improve competence and training of involved personnel both from operators and con-
tractors.
• Start the process of updating the NORSOK drilling standards to include recent experiences
related to well barriers. This should include the qualification process for barrier elements.
• Operational decisions during abnormal situations often lead to well failure today. This is a
problem that concerns many parties, such as training of operators and management. This
is something that needs to be worked on in the future.
• Design issues such as long-term effects are not sufficiently considered today, this is a sub-
ject that is important to focus on in the future..
• The challenge is to account for rare events that may lead to major incidents. The normal
approach is to focus on frequent and low-consequence incidents.
4.3 How can Human and Organizational factors contribute to
Well Integrity?
Chapter 2 together with section 4.2.5 tells us that HO factors is a very important concept related
to well integrity. It must therefore be included in the engineering and design of a workplace or a
working environment because they influence work performance. As mention earlier in this the-
sis the HO factor aspect consists of environmental conditions with a workplace layout, and the
cognitive demands of interface design. HO factors focus on the human element; that includes
competence, abilities, human needs and limitations, the technological element; that includes
design, functionality, usability, integration and how the technical element supports the oper-
ators to preform their work safely and effectively. Finally the organizational element; that can
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include the manning, support, management and structure. To counteract and prevent a dan-
gerous event from happening doe to human error, human experiences have to be implemented
when designing equipment and technologies and make these system to be able to handle errors.
In principle, it is important to maintain a comprehensive focus and control interactive factors
that have a notable influence on human performance The principal argument is that the actual
work performance has to be better understood in the HTO perspective, to reduce system vul-
nerability and to improve performance from a safety and environmental point of view (Vignes,
2011)
The Human element in improving Well Integrity
The HTO perspective related to well integrity situations can be described related to the human-,
technological- and the organizational element. The human element can include challenges re-
lated to human limitations, skills, knowledge, competency, education, experience and training.
Stress and time pressure are other factors that can affect human performance (Bailey, 1996). The
identified challenges related to the human element include well control training and knowledge,
well integrity training and courses and human computer interface:
Well control training and knowledge
Under the planning phase, drilling operations and well intervention is the conditions of the
formation, and specially the formation pressure, a very important factor. Improper formation
pressure detection or handling of kicks may result in loss of well control (Skalle and Podio, 1998).
Loss of well control may led to a blowout. A blowout is a result of failure to control a kick caused
ether by equipment failure or human error. Well control training is performed to prevent situa-
tions where loss of the primary and secondary barriers results in a blowout or other catastrophic
events (NSOAF, 2005). Well control training must therefore include all positions from well de-
sign, drilling crew, well service crew (contractors) and service personnel (NSOAF, 2005). The
North Sea Offshore Authorities Forum (NSOAF) has identified the industrial challenges related
to well control management, competency and training including the quality of the simulator
training and the focus on passing the exams (NSOAF, 2005). Companies approach to well in-
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tegrity is usually done whit the NORSOK D-010 standard. The NORSOK D-010 requires regular
and realistic well control drills to be performed to train involved personnel to detect and pre-
vent loss of barriers (Standar Norway., 2004). A significant flaw in the training programs today is
that well planning , well construction and well integrity is not included in the training program
or in the certification process (OLF., 2011). The training program should provide a discussion of
past accidents and how they could have been prevented to better be able to identify important
features in all the aspects of well control training and knowledge. This is important since the
well control decisions require knowledge of these subjects.
Well integrity training and courses
To improve the well integrity on the NCS, has the OLF has published guideline number 117 in
an effort to try to improve the well integrity (OLF., 2011). The guideline covers well integrity
training. This means that the guidelines helps define what to cover in the well integrity training
program and emphasizes who should be participating in the program. To be able to minimize
or eliminate the possibility of misunderstandings regarding the well integrity fundamentals, the
NORSOK D-010 terminology and company-specific training are often included in the indus-
try well integrity training program. Many operator on the NCS are preforming NORSOK D-010
courses and company internal well integrity seminars every second year to update it’s opera-
tors on the current status on well integrity. The seminars include operational cases related to
well integrity, the regulations, NORSOK D-010 (including well barrier schematics) and well in-
tegrity categorization. A positive side effect of these seminars that the companies is starting to
understand and exploit is that better well integrity knowledge may lead to increased ability to
identification of the challenges related to the human perspective. One example illustrating this
is the performance of the negative pressure test in the Macondo accident. One of the barriers
in the Macondo accident was the negative pressure test that included failures during evaluation
of the test results. The BP report concluded that the requirements and test guideline related to
what is an accepted negative pressure test should be evaluated (Graham et al., 2011). This acci-
dent is a perfect example that the well integrity knowledge needs to be improved. The focus in
the industri needs to be change from just doing the tests, to actually understand why do we per-
form these tests, what do the tests tell us and what can the consequences be if a non-acceptable
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test is accepted? Well integrity training and competence need to be improved, and this may also
include an evaluation of the test tools (Vignes, 2011).
Human computer interface
Dynamic environments generates a large volume of information from various sources. Con-
trol and interpretation of this information is vital to ensure a safe and clear work environment.
People in control of human computer interactions may therefore introduce a significant safety
perspective in the work place (Randhol and Carlsen, 2007). A good example illustrating this is
the driller in the drilling cabin offshore. The driller is responsible for operation of the drilling
crew at the drill floor and at the same time manage well control. This means that the driller
operates equipment with severe technical complexity in the drilling cabin, combine this with
the totality of the drilling module, makes the driller dependent on extensive use of cameras,
telephone, and radio communication due to inadequate view. This means that the driller needs
to have control over a lot of monitors at the same time. There are limitations related to how
much information a human being can receive, analyse and handle. Studies preformed by PSA
and DNV shows that a number of drillers sometimes work so hard and starts to move towards
an irresponsible practise in the industry. The study also shows that the drillers have to perform
too many task during their work performance, resulting in an excessive workload (Asland et al.,
2005, 2007). This is an dangerous practice and may lead to catastrophic situations. HO factor
analyses should therefore be performed to reduce the amount of information the driller has to
evaluate and handle.
The Technical element to improve Well Integrity
The technical aspect of well integrity is perhaps the most dominant element in well integrity.
This means that there is many technical challenges that has been identified related to improv-
ing the well integrity situations. Several technical challenges have been identified on the NCS
with regard to qualification, testing and verification of well barrier elements, and other techni-
cally defined challenges are related to the need for automation of certain well operations.
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Qualification and testing of well barrier elements
NORSOK D-010 describes the qualification process for well barrier elements. The standard
includes 50 well barrier elements acceptance tables in chapter 15 which describe testing and
qualification of well barrier elements with reference to relevant standards. The standard is not
perfect, well barrier elements such as the gas lift valves (GLV), well isolation materials such as
the well formation, Sandaband, Thermaset and drilling operations such as managed pressure
drilling (MPD) are not included in this standard.
Equipment that fall outside the specs of the NORSOK D-010 standard can for instance be
defined in the ISO standard 14310. The standard defines the leak criteria that are generally
used for other equipment than that defined in the standard (Vignes, 2011). There are some
identified shortcomings/limitations related to the ISO 14310 concerning qualification of equip-
ment and well barriers (Statoil., 2011). The procedure described in ISO 14310 for testing vari-
ous equipment, dose not represent conditions the equipment meets out in the field. The test
interval is only required to last 15 minutes when the products are expected to last the life of
the well. The standard does not include a long term integrity test. The testing is performed
in a new casing and in a centralized test fixture, but the installed equipment is placed in non-
centralized deviated wells and can experience casing wear over time (Statoil., 2011). The ISO
testing is performed for the maximum and minimum values of the equipment performance pa-
rameters. Some operators use the equipment somewhere inside the qualified performance test,
which is not covered in the testing (Vignes, 2011). To ensure that the equipments can withstand
the conditions experienced in the field, should the equipment be tested according to the loads,
temperatures, fluids and pressures the equipment will be exposed to during the life cycle of the
well. According to Vignes (2011) should the implementation of the equipment qualification and
testing probably be defined with a basis in field performance.
Verification of well barrier elements
Verification of a cement plug is performed according to NORSOK D-010: "The plug installa-
tion shall be verified through documentation of job performance; records fm. cement operations
(volume pumped, returns during cementing, etc.). Its position should be verified, by means of:
tagging, or measure to confirm depth of firm plug". The cement criteria related to full returns are
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often used to decide whether to preform a cement evaluation logging operation (Vignes, 2011).
Receiving full returns is used as an indicator of cement (or other fluids) not being lost to the
formation, but it provides limited information about the cement location, cement channeling
or cement contamination (Graham et al., 2011). Proper cement placement, and the mechani-
cal properties of the cement design and logging tools needed further development to be able to
verify the cement integrity.
Automation
Technical challenges has been identified related to the tubing computer. Important graphs maid
by the tubing computer is being compromised by controlled makeup equipment and poor res-
olution (Vam Service, 2010). This means that poor resolution can make the graphs look accept-
able but with increased resolution, may the graphs not be acceptable (Vam Service, 2010). Other
challenges are associated with the HO factors and the operators who monitor and verify the tub-
ing and casing makeup graph. To prevent unwanted events from happening, decision support
tools during the evaluation of the torque graph could be a useful aid to lift some of the stress the
operators are facing in their working-day. Discussions related to the need for further technology
to evaluate the seal integrity as a contributing factor to improving well integrity in tubing, liner
and casing connections is presented in more detail in Vignes (2011), section 3.3.1.
The Organizational element in improving Well Integrity
The organizational elements consists of procedures, training programs, handover documen-
tation, well integrity management system, and well barrier schematics. The organizational well
integrity elements includes the management system, routines to preform the well integrity jobs,
standardization and industry standards.
National and international standards
On the NCS regulations to govern safety and the working environment in the petroleum in-
dustry is controlled by the PSA. The regulations is regularly updated and further developed to
be able to be as safe and effective as possible (PSA, 2011b). A large number of functional re-
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quirements are listed in the regulations where standards and norms specify the "regulations
level of prudence". The regulations refer to the industrial standards, such as ISO, API or NOR-
SOK standards, which means that they have to continually be updated by the industry so they
can present the best practices available in the industry. Naturally this updating proses of the
regulations and standards introduces organizational challenges. Example of standards in need
of continuous updating are NORSOK D-001 Drilling Facilities (Tonning, 2006), NORSOK D-002
Syst., Requirements Well Intervention Equipment (PSA, 2011b), NORSOK D-010 Well Integrity
standard (SandabandTM, 2006). Perhaps by converting all of these into ISO standards may con-
tribute to minimization of the organizational challenges. The importance of this organizational
challenge was further reinforced after PSA identified this as a contribution to the Deepwater
Horizon accident. The summery of the PSA report suggested that there is a need for establish-
ing routines for regular updating of the NORSOK standards (PSA, 2011a)
Well integrity management system, handover documentation and well barrier schematics
The fundamental principle of having a safe and productive well during its life cycle depends
strongly on having functioning well integrity. Well integrity includes well design, well construc-
tion, operations, suspension and abandonment of the wells. All this elements that well integrity
consist of is crucial for the well, therefore should well integrity and well integrity philosophy be
in the heart of WIMS (Stuart and Foo, 2010). Well integrity includes having all the necessary
barriers in place, understanding and respecting the barriers, testing and verifying the barriers
and having contingencies in place when the barriers fail (Stuart and Foo, 2010). The purpose of
the WIMS is to identify the potential hazards that may occur during the different phases for of
the wells life. Properties such as pressure and loads, fluids and formation fluids, temperature,
porosity and permeability, wear and fatigue, faults and unconformity1 are factors according to
Vignes (2011) that may influence the well integrity. A detailed description of the minimum crite-
ria for the WIMS is described in the OLF recommended Guideline Number 117 (OLF., 2011). The
guideline points out that the WIMS should cover well integrity at all times through the life cycle
of the well (OLF., 2011). The main focus for the OLF guidelines is on the operational phase and
covers the following elements with a basis in the HSE regulations (Corneliussen et al., 2007): or-
1A surface of contact between two groups of unconformable strata.
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ganization (licensees, operators, contractors and all involved parties), well design (well design
requirements and standards including the ALARP principle) , operational procedures (opera-
tional limits, testing/monitoring/verification and maintenance, emergency preparedness and
procedures and transfer of information), data system (data system, information system and
processes throughout the lifetime of the well), analysis (identify and quantify risk and ensure
continuous improvement in all phases) and the programs, procedures and well integrity system
to prevent faults and situations of hazard and accident (Vignes, 2011).
The WIMS is a software tool that indicates the well integrity status and how to handle the
well integrity problem from construction until the well is permanently plugged and abandoned
(Corneliussen et al., 2007; Haga et al., 2009; Tarmoom et al., 2007; Anders et al., 2008; Wakama
and Adeniyi, 2004; Smith and Milanovic, 2008). Different key indicators is used by the system to
document the process from detection, analysis and implementation of the risk-reducing mea-
sures. Talisman Energy Norway includes four categories in their WIMS (Haga et al., 2009): the
well integrity status (OLF., 2011; OLF, 2007; OLF., 2008), well barrier status (the well barrier con-
ditions) (Standar Norway., 2004), the annuli status (detects abnormal pressures and pressure
against defined criteria) and valve status (based on the valve test results). The WIMS consists
of the handover documentation process, real-time pressure and temperature data, well design
data (including design limitations, fluids and schematics), operational alarm limits, and the well
integrity incidents are summarized with links to the incidents reports.
To be able to make the handover of documentation most efficient should the well integrity
management system (OLF., 2011) be able to define what information that needs to be trans-
ferred, and how this is done. The handover procedure applies when the well responsibility is
transferred from one organization to another e.g from drilling to operation, from the day crew
to the night crew and from one company to another. The information needed to be included
in the handover from well construction to the well operation team is defined in NORSOK D-010
section 8.7.1 (Standar Norway., 2004). According to the OLF Guideline Number 117 (OLF., 2011)
should the handover documentation contain the well construction information, well barrier
schematic, completion schematic, handover certificate which presents the status of the valves,
pressure and fluids, and the operational limitations.
Well barrier schematics (WBS) is being used in the industry to illustrate and "point out" the
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well integrity situation in a well in a one-page format (OLF., 2011). An example of a WBS is show
in Figure 4.3. The WBS is used to define the well barriers (primary and secondary) in the well.
This is a most helpful "tool" for the operators during the life cycle of the well. This is because
many factors influence the well integrity station in the well and may change the situation in the
well over time. To be able to understand and define the well barriers is therefore very important
to control and maintain the well from start to finish.
Figure 4.3: WBS example (Standar Norway., 2004)
Chapter 5
Well Integrity in Drilling and Well
operations at Veslefrikk: A case on the
potential Human Error Causation
Paradigms
5.1 Introduction
As highlighted earlier errors are caused by various sources, and the analysis of error causation in
complex systems requires a method capable of identifying specific areas that have contributed
to the occurrence of a given error. The so-called "human error causation paradigms" proposed
by Redmill and Rajan (1997) and listed in chapter 2, seems to provide an interesting basis for
further work, especially within the offshore industry (see Figure 2.7).
A letter was sent out to the drilling supervisor at Veslefrikk requesting information on planned
activities and improvements in HO factors in drilling operations. The feedback data from the in-
dustry is a good base to identify challenges. The human error causation paradigms is used to
analyse the feedback data and elaborate on the complex HTO interactions, to get an interesting
overview of this complex work setting and to spot the critical influence factors that have a large
potential to contribute to safety and work performance risk (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). The dif-
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ferent paradigms (engineering, individual, cognitive and organizational) enable the challenges
to be looked at from different points of view and necessary discussions can be held regarding
improvement measures for the working situations. This has specific benefits from a safety and
well integrity point of view, given the complex and dynamic nature of work performance (Vi-
gnes, 2011).
Both drilling and well operations have a large tendency for errors during work performance
due to the complexity and the dynamic nature of the work setting (Vignes and Jayantha, 2011).
Several interactions exist in this process in technical, organizational, and individual terms. The
explicit and implicit connections have to be functional and fail-proof to ensure the safety in-
tegrity of the work setting (Vignes and Jayantha, 2011). This means that even the smallest error
needs to be identified and properly evaluated to have a clear understanding of potential risk.
The next section elaborates on those various sources for causation of errors in drilling and well
operations at Veslefrikk; these are classified into engineering, organizational, individual, and
cognitive.
5.2 Human Error Causation Paradigms in Drilling and Well op-
erations
The human error causation paradigms in the drilling and well operations are classified into
four paradigms discussed earlier, namely: the engineering error paradigm, organizational er-
ror paradigm, cognitive error paradigm and the individual error paradigm. PSA and DNV has
conducted studies related to HO factors and work situation of drillers and wireline operators.
Challenges related to the drillers where: design of the driller’s chair, switches, display, and an
overwhelming amount of information that the drillers had to handle, analyse and respond to.
Challenges related to the wireline operator where: design of the wireline cabin, communication
within the operator crew, and the number of procedures. Both the drillers and the wireline oper-
ators working situation include time pressure, limited supervisor training, and limited time and
motivation to conduct the safe job analyse1 (SJA) (Asland et al., 2005, 2007; Vignes and Jayantha,
1A safe job analysis is a systematic and stepwise review of all risk factors prior to a given work activity or opera-
tion, so that steps can be taken to eliminate or control the identified risk factors during preparation and execution
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2011).
The feedback data obtained by the drilling supervisor at Veslefrikk only includes the work-
ing situation for the driller. Therefore the human error causation paradigms will only analyse
HO factors and work situation of the driller at Veslefrikk. Today’s situation on Veslefrikk will be
compared with the findings of the original study conducted by PSA and DNV and will hopefully
answer this thesis project task number five. Improvement measures proposed by Asland et al.
(2005, 2007) will be listed.
Presentation of the identified challenges based on the human error causation paradigms
First, the challenges identified through the human error causation paradigms will be presented
shortly in Table 5.1 to provide an overview. Second, the challenges will be further described from
the paradigms different points of view.
Table 5.1: Presenting the identified challenges through the human error causation paradigms at
Veslefrikk.
Human error causation paradigms
Veslefrikk Engineering Individual Cognitive Organizational
DSimulator
training
DLarge amount
of procedures
DLimited possibility to vary
sitting positions
DDifficulties
locating relevant
procedures
DSeminars DPrioritize
meeting ahead
of drilling opera-
tions
DLimited possibility to shift
between sitting and stand-
ing work positions
DLarge amount
of procedures
DOne-week
overlapping
DToo general
meetings
Id
en
ti
fi
ed
C
h
al
le
n
ge
s
DCommunication equip-
ment is not easy available
DTime pressure
DDisturbing elements: tele-
phone and alarms
DDangerous amount of
workload
of the work activity or operation (Norsk Oil and Gas., 2011).
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5.2.1 Error Causation potential from Engineering Paradigm
The engineering error causation paradigm focuses on the technical aspect of the drill operators
working situations. The paradigm looks at the driller’s as an unreliable "component" of the total
working system. The paradigm shows that the driller has challenges related to the large amount
of information he has to handle analyse, and respond to.
The Feedback data from Veslefrikk indicates that there is limited possibility to vary the chair’s
sitting positions, and the shift between sitting and standing is a challenge. The same sitting posi-
tion throughout the shift has negative consequences for muscle stress and may negatively affect
the drill operators concentration, and thereby increase the risk of well accidents. Analysing the
work situation is of major importance to ensure that no conflict between the operational equip-
ment placement (e.g., the driller’s chair) and the operational tasks during the design phase of
the driller’s working situations exists. The reduction of conflict helps reducing the risk for well
failures because of badly placed controls and switches (Asland et al., 2005).
The drilling supervisor at Veslefrikk (Harald Engesland) has the following comment to ques-
tions regarding physical conditions:
"Selve stolen/sete kunne vært mye bedre"
Translated: The chair/seat itself could be much better
The communications equipment (control, switches, radio communication etc.) is from time
to time not easy accessible. Badly placed controls and switches on the panels in relation to the
drill operators working position (the locations do not interact well with the chair’s movement
and have bad underarm support) or simultaneous or sequential operations exist on Veslefrikk.
During design of new operator stations, it is important to ensure that the equipment placement
is not in conflict with operational task (Asland et al., 2005). Sufficient analyses should be con-
ducted early in the planning stages.
In addition to the many responsibilities, the driller experiences essentially two main dis-
turbing elements: the telephone and people in the drilling cabin. The supervisor states that
there is many unnecessary telephone calls that is very disturbing for the work progress and can
influence the risk in relation to handling well control and well integrity situations.
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The drilling supervisor at Veslefrikk (Harald Engesland) has the following comment to ques-
tions regarding the demands and control on the job:
"Her gjelder det å holde fokus"
Translated: Here it is important to stay focused
Challenges were identified due to the automation complexity with too many alarms and too
many “nice to know” alarms. The feedback indicates that the drillers know what to do with the
different alarms but the supervisor claims that the alarms do not function properly. Alarms with
no essential function is a irritating element and may distract the drillers from observing real
threats to well integrity. The drillers work interactively with the screens that support the execu-
tion of the various operations. The level of automation of the driller’s working situation leads to
a large amount of information. The amount of information that the driller has to coordinate is
significant during his work performance. The feedback for the industry also indicates that the
driller’s workload may be on the border of what is considered dangerous, and this is also a risk
in relation to handle well control and well integrity situations (Asland et al., 2005, 2007).
Comparison with the original study conducted by PSA and DNV shows that today’s HO factor
challenges in drill and well operations related to the engineering error paradigm on Veslefrikk,
generally is slightly better than the overall industry practices(Asland et al., 2005, 2007). The
feedback states for example that it is pretty easy to notify people when they are in the drilling
cabin on Veslefrikk, this has been identified as a challenge in the overall industry
Asland et al. (2005, 2007) concluded that half of the drillers in the industry experienced too
much information on the screens and an information overload was present. The situation on
Veslefrikk are minimal compared with the industry. The drilling supervisor on Veslefrikk states
that the amount of information on the screen is very rare or never a problem.
The drilling supervisor at Veslefrikk (Harald Engesland) has the following comment to ques-
tions regarding the technical system:
"Det meste er oppgradert/oppdatert"
Translated: Most of the equipment are upgraded/up to date
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Measures proposed/implemented by the companies
Examples, proposed by Asland et al. (2005, 2007) on how companies can regulate the use of
telephone in the drilling cabin:
• Change in attitude. Get the message out to all personnel on board to contact the driller
through phone calls as little as possible to reduce the disturbance. Call the assistant driller
instead.
• Close telephone lines from land.
• Give first priority to radio communication.
• Introduce cordless telephone with number display so the driller does not have to stretch
to reach the telephone.
Examples of measures to control access to the driller’s cabin Asland et al. (2005, 2007):
• Do not use the driller’s cabin as a meeting room.
• Change in attitude. Get the message out regarding access restriction in the driller’s cabin.
Consider how information regarding disturbances in the driller’s cabin can be best com-
municated to relevant personnel.
• The drillers are encouraged to speak up if there are still too many people in the driller’s
cabin.
Examples of measures in connection with physical aspects and the drilling systems Asland
et al. (2005, 2007):
• Carry out a mapping of physical design of driller’s cabins on all rigs together with drilling
personnel and personnel with ergonomics/Human Factors expertise. Based on that map-
ping, make the necessary improvements to satisfy the requirements in NORSOK S-002.
• Carry out a mapping of the user-friendliness of the drilling systems to see which systems
do not meet current requirements, including alarm requirements. What should be done
to achieve systems that support the driller in his/her work?
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• Review the alarm system, focusing on which functions the driller should handle, and what
information is necessary in order to safeguard these functions.
5.2.2 Error Causation potential from Individual Paradigm
The individual error causation paradigm within the drill operators considers the time pressure,
limited training to act as supervisor, limited time to conduct the SJA, and the operators motiva-
tion to perform the SJA.
The drill operation on Veslefrikk appears to have little or no challenges related to the risk
perception and the use of risk aversive measures in work performance. The feedback indicates
that the driller feels that his own understanding of risk is good. As work supervisor, the driller
states that he believes that he is able to ensure that the personnel working for him have a good
understanding of risk. The only challenges that the drill supervisor mentions, is the employees
in the service companies and their lack of risk understanding. The risk understanding on the
part of employees in the service companies is perceived as being good, but the feedback shows
a somewhat lower score than the other employees and is therefore identified as a challenge.
The feedback states that the driller on Veslefrikk always has enough time to conduct a SJA,
and the driller states that SJA helps bringing attention to aspect in regard to performing a safe
job. Procedures and work programs are well understood and is always followed, but some diffi-
culties locating relevant procedures and the sheer amount of procedures is identified as a chal-
lenge. This can also be seen as an organizational error paradigm challenge.
The drilling supervisor at Veslefrikk (Harald Engesland) has the following comment to ques-
tions regarding the procedures:
"Her er vi blitt mye flinkere enn før"
Translated: Situation today is much better than what it was before
The survey performed shows that the driller on Veslefrikk is from time to time affected by
time pressure related to the quality assurance of the work program. The driller also states that
there is not enough time to review the work descriptions in the shift meetings. These aspects
shows that there is a potential for safety risk related to the opportunities available for the driller
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and drilling crew to have an overview and proper understanding of risk related to the work situ-
ation (Asland et al., 2005, 2007).
Comparison with the original study conducted by PSA and DNV shows that today’s HO factor
challenges in drill and well operations related to the individual error paradigm on Veslefrikk,
is better than the overall industry practices (Asland et al., 2005, 2007). The study shows that
many aspect related to SJA is a problem in the industry. 20% of the drillers who attended the
original study reported that occasionally they did not have time to conduct a SJA, and some
of the drillers have experienced that SJA does not always help to bring attention to aspects in
regarding performing a safe job (Asland et al., 2007; Heber et al., 2008). This is not a challenge
on Veslefrikk.
Measures proposed/implemented by the companies
Examples proposed by Asland et al. (2005, 2007) of measures regarding procedures:
• The procedures should be made more user-friendly and appropriate.
• Review of existing procedures with the objective of reducing the number of documents.
• The procedures should be more easily accessible. For example, they should be stored
where the work is performed.
• Need for improved knowledge regarding the procedures that exist. This may be connected
to a general need for training and how new personnel are introduced to rig-specific fac-
tors/procedures
• Introduction of periodic procedure courses, to maintain awareness/knowledge about the
procedures.
• Review of the mentor arrangement to ensure transfer of the company’s desired attitudes
and values to new employees, including the principle that procedures must be used and
followed.
Examples of measures in relation to the work program Asland et al. (2005, 2007):
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• Check whether necessary time is allocated to qualify the work program before the work is
started.
• In cooperation with the operator, ensure that adequate time is allowed for reviewing the
work program.
5.2.3 Error Causation potential from Cognitive Paradigm
The cognitive error causation paradigm within the drill operators considers the risk understand-
ing, the installation-specific training and experience.
The feedback indicates that facilitation for updating professional expertise is fairly often
present and the training the driller receive is often not related the the job they actually do. Three
major areas of improvement were highlighted by the driller; Simulator training (beyond training
in pressure control simulator), seminars where the team trains together and courses related to
professional disciplines. The driller also states that he fairly often receives training in the lo-
cal conditions when he arrives on a new facility. Training and follow-up of new employees is
also pretty good. The feedback shows that the driller often has a good overview of the working
situation. Also one-week overlap on new facilities occasionally happens.
The drilling supervisor at Veslefrikk (Harald Engesland) has the following comment to ques-
tions regarding what kind of training he misses?:
"Simulator, case studier"
Translated: Simulator, case studies
According to Vignes (2011), the use of ad hoc teams where the personnel are often rotated
between installation is a possible source of negative side effects. This situation can influence the
quality of the interaction between personnel and also the quality in professional interactions
between the members of a given team, and this may lead to some challenges related to integrity
issues. This situation can become even more critical when personnel with limited experience
are hired in at short notice to perform specific tasks, with limited time to prepare the work.
On the other hand, risk understanding and subsequent behavior during drill and well op-
erations, can be attributed to a large extent to cognition, where competence plays a major role
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as a prerequisite. Without risk understanding on all levels, it is difficult to conduct specific ac-
tivities in a safe manner. As the complexity increases with automation and other technological
developments, it obviously creates a need for a systematic competence management program,
even including some other types of competence and training to cope with the changing work
demands (Asland et al., 2005).
Comparison with the original study conducted by PSA and DNV shows that today’s HO factor
challenges in drill and well operations related to the cognitive paradigm on Veslefrikk, is mostly
the same as in the overall industry practices (Asland et al., 2005, 2007).
Measures proposed/implemented by the companies
Examples proposed by Asland et al. (2005, 2007) of training-related measures:
• Personnel are given an opportunity to work as extra personnel in connection with promo-
tions. This will provide better training prior to starting a new job.
• Consider facilitating a one-week overlap in connection with transfers to a new unit.
• Review of existing internal mentor arrangement. Examine training and course matrix,
transfer of experience and attitudes.
• Arrange well integrity seminars four times per year, all drillers are to be included in these
seminars.
• Offer E-training course in "downhole understanding" to all drillers.
5.2.4 Error Causation potential from Organizational Paradigm
The organizational error causation paradigm within the drill operators focuses on the drillers
working situations in relation to the operator competence level, procedures, communication
and management.
The feedback indicates that the sheer amount of procedures is a recurring challenge, which
causes coordination challenges. The communication between the manager and driller on Vesle-
frikk is good. The driller states that the supervisor is involved in the work that is performed. The
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driller also states that he always receives sufficient support and help from the management for
their work when needed. However, he also experiences that the supervisor from time to time
prioritizes meetings ahead of the actual drilling operations. The driller is pretty satisfied with
feedback from the supervisor regarding the work performed and has a regular dialogue with the
supervisor. The threshold to contact the drilling supervisor when he is on a meeting is also fairly
satisfying on Veslefrikk which means that decision making has a higher chance to be quick and
efficient in dangerous situations.
The driller states that he feels that there is a good environment/culture on the shifts, and
that he receive help and support form the team. This can also be seen from an individual error
paradigm point of view.
Meetings is a form of communication where management and operators exchanges infor-
mation to better perform decision making. The survey shows that the departure meeting are
too general and that the driller feels that he from time to time is not confident in the job he is
supposed to do. The driller is fairly satisfied with the necessary information received in the shift
meeting and he is confident that this meeting contribute to the safe execution of the job. This
shows that an overview status of the situation and the work to be done is good on Veslefrikk.
This is important in order to have an understanding of the risk associated with the work. This
can also be viewed in context with the cognitive error paradigm.
Comparison with the original study conducted by PSA and DNV shows that today’s HO factor
challenges in drill and well operations related to the organizational error paradigm on Veslefrikk,
is better than the overall industry practices(Asland et al., 2005, 2007).
According to Asland et al. (2005, 2007); Vignes (2011); Vignes and Jayantha (2011) the origi-
nal survey shows that the development of competence is a challenge in drill operations because
of the fluctuation in the activity levels on the NCS (Asland et al., 2005). These challenges have
shown a potential for an increase in incident risk on the NCS during high activity periods. It is
difficult for the drilling companies to provide sufficient personnel with adequate competence
and experience. The companies then provide an increasing number of people with less experi-
ence for a specific set of tasks. This is a short-term solution for the companies. When the activity
level on the NCS reduces, the risk for retrenchment increases since the companies cannot hold
on to extra resources. This situation often affects personnel with the least experience and those
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who were last to be employed. After some time, when the activity levels on the NCS rises again,
most of the companies are not prepared, and inexperienced personnel are employed. This is a
cycle process that has brought much concern in the employment market.
PSA and DNV also discovered that incorrect use of radios and cultural differences are impor-
tant challenges. According to Asland et al. (2005) the procedures regarding the use of radios a
is problem. It is important that all involved are familiar with good radio etiquette and under-
stand which channel and which language to use. Communication challenges related to when
operators work at different decks is also identified as a problem in the industry (Asland et al.,
2005).
This complex challenges seems to be non existing on Veslefrikk. The feedback has no defini-
tive indication of challenges related to cultural differences, communication between different
decks and development of competence but I suspect that this might be because the questions
in the survey is not precise enough regarding these challenges.
Measures proposed/implemented by the companies
Examples of measures proposed by Asland et al. (2005, 2007) as regards management:
• Training in the responsibility that follows with the leader’s role; the importance of feed-
back both on a daily basis and in more formal aspects.
• Courses addressing "the difficult talk" and employee appraisal conferences
Examples of measures proposed by Asland et al. (2005, 2007) as regards procedures:
• The procedures should be made more user-friendly and appropriate.
• Review of existing procedures with the objective of reducing the number of documents.
• The procedures should be more easily accessible. For example, they should be stored
where the work is performed.
• Need for improved knowledge regarding the procedures that exist. This may be connected
to a general need for training and how new personnel are introduced to rig-specific fac-
tors/procedures
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• Introduction of periodic procedure courses, to maintain awareness/knowledge about the
procedures.
• Review of the mentor arrangement to ensure transfer of the company’s desired attitudes
and values to new employees, including the principle that procedures must be used and
followed.
Chapter 6
Summary and Recommendations for
Further Work
This thesis explains the concept of well integrity related to HO factors. A detailed literary sur-
vey has been conducted to give the reader a decent understanding of the concept and different
models and methods has been presented in a detailed manner. A classification scheme has been
recommended for HO factors.
This thesis seeks to improve the well integrity situation as it is today by analysing earlier
studies and new data created for this thesis. Work done by Vignes (2011); Asland et al. (2005,
2007); PSA (2011a); Vignes and Jayantha (2011) has been looked through with the HTO perspec-
tive to be able to highlight challenges related to the human-, technological- and the organiza-
tional element in the overall industry. A letter was sent out to the drilling supervisor at Veslefrikk
requesting information on planned activities and improvements in HO factors in drilling oper-
ations. The human error causation paradigm is used to analyse this new data and help spotting
the critical influencing factors that have a large potential to contribute to safety and work per-
formance risk (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). The results from the survey conducted by PSA and
DNV and shown in chapter 4, is used as a benchmark to be able to compare today’s situation on
Veslefrikk with the overall industry.
The summary and conclusions chapter is organized as follows:
• First to give a simple and easy summary and conclusion on this thesis objective.
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• Then to give a summary and conclusion of the project task, represented by the different
chapters.
6.1 Summary and Conclusions
Summary and Conclusion of the Objective
The author’s approach to the summary and conclusion of this thesis objective:
Have the implemented measures proposed by PSA and DNV had any effect on the HO factors re-
lated to well integrity in the various phases of a well’s life, at Veslefrikk? is to give an easy overview
of the identified challenges on Veslefrikk and the overall industry, represented in Table 6.1. The
table lists the identified challenges and make it easy to compare the situation on Veslefrikk vs.
the overall industry. The symbol D indicates identified challenges and the symbol D indi-
cates if the identified challenges is more challenging.
By analysing Table 6.1 can we easy see that the overall industry has more D symbols which
means that the overall industry has more challenges related to HO factors. The answer on this
thesis objective can then simply be interpret as YES.
Summary and Conclusion of the Project tasks
Chapter 2 addresses this thesis project task number one and gives a detailed literature survey
related to HO factors. The reader is given an introduction to different aspects related to HO
factors. The human performance model, decision making, work performance, PIFs and human
error causation paradigm are presented together with a presentation of the HTO perspective. In
this thesis, it is important that the reader is given a detailed insight in this aspect since Chapter
3 and 4 use these methods to analyse different situations.
Chapter 3 addresses this thesis project task number two, identify classification schemes for
HO factors. This thesis shows that this can be done in many ways. 17 methods were identified
in total by the Health and Safety Executive (2009) to be of potential use to classify HO factors.
Many of these methods are developed for other industries (namely nuclear and aviation) and is
therefore identified as not well suited for classifying HO factors relevant to well integrity. The
CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY 97
Table 6.1: Summary of chapter 5
Veslefrikk Overall industry
D Large amounts of information
D Limited possibility to vary sit-
ting positions
D Limited possibility to vary sit-
ting positions
D Limited possibility to shift be-
tween sitting and standing work
positions
D Limited possibility to shift be-
tween sitting and standing work
positions
D Communication equipment is
not easy available
D Communication equipment is
not easy available
E
n
gi
n
ee
ri
n
g
p
ar
ad
ig
m
D Disturbing elements: tele-
phone and alarms
D Disturbing elements: tele-
phone, people in drilling cabin
and alarms
D Dangerous amount of work-
load
D Dangerous amount of work-
load
Id
en
ti
fi
ed
C
h
al
le
n
ge
s
D Lack of risk understanding:
service companies
D Lack of risk understanding:
regular employees and service
companies
D Difficulties locating relevant
procedures
D Difficulties locating relevant
procedures
D Large amount of procedures D Large amount of procedures
In
d
iv
id
u
al
p
ar
ad
ig
m
D Time pressure D Time pressure
D Challenges related to SJA
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Veslefrikk Overall industry
D Simulator training D Simulator training
D Seminars D Seminars
C
o
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e
p
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ig
m
D One-week overlapping D One-week overlapping
D Large amount of procedures D Large amount of procedures
Id
en
ti
fi
ed
C
h
al
le
n
ge
s
D Prioritize meeting ahead of
drilling operations
D Development of competence
D Too general meetings D Too general meetings
D Prioritize meeting ahead of
drilling operations
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
p
ar
ad
ig
m
D Communication challenges:
work in different decks and cul-
tural differences
method identified by the author as possible candidates for classification, is carefully analysed.
The WHW, SRK and SLMV methods undertaken in this thesis were of a general nature and are
therefore not recommended. THERP is an old, very strong and efficient method for classify-
ing HO factors. Many industries use this method frequently and have great success with the
result. According to Rausand (2011) are the main limitations to THERP method resource inten-
sive and time-consuming. THERP also requires a level of detail that can be excessive for many
assessments. By taking the limitations into consideration together with the study preformed
by Health and Safety Executive (2009) the THERP method is not recommended to classify HO
factors related to well integrity.
The STEPP method is well suited for classifying and optimizing HO factors related to well in-
tegrity. Previous studies preformed by Wilson and Stanton (2001); Hendrick and Brenner (1987)
related to major accidents such as the Piper Alpha incident confirms that the STEPP method
is well suited to analyse, classify and optimize HO factors in the context of well integrity. After
careful consideration and elimination together with discussions with the drilling supervisor at
Veslefrikk, the STEPP method is selected as the best classification scheme for HO factors rele-
vant to well integrity in various phases of a well’s life.
Chapter 4 addresses this thesis project tasks number three and four. There are unforeseen
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factors that have a critical influence on the work performance of the different operators in a
complex work setting. The situation is no different for systems regarding well integrity. Well
integrity is defined as "application of technical, operational and organizational solutions to re-
duce risk of uncontrolled release of formation fluids throughout the life cycle of a well (Standar
Norway., 2004) and it stands to reason that a proper knowledge of the well integrity system from
a HTO perspective, can give a better working environment and an opportunity to improve the
health, safety integrity, and work performance.
Challenges related to the Human element were identified and categorised as: well control
training and knowledge, well integrity training and courses, human computer interface:
• Well control training and knowledge: Well control management, competence and training
including the quality of the simulator training and focus on passing the exams have been
identified as a challenge. A significant flaw in the training programs today is that well
planning, well construction and well integrity are not included in the training program or
in the certification process (OLF., 2011). The training program should provide a discussion
of past accidents and how they could have been prevented to better be able to identify
important features on all the aspect of well control training and knowledge.
• Well integrity training and courses: Better well integrity knowledge has been identified as
a challenge. The culture in the industry today focuses mostly on just doing the tests and
not actually understand why we perform these tests, what do the tests tell us and what can
the consequences can be if a non-acceptable test is accepted. Many operators on the NCS
have started performing NORSOK D-010 courses every second year to try and change this
lack of integrity knowledge. Positive effects of the increase focus on integrity knowledge
can be illustrated by looking at the negative pressure test in the Macondo accident. If the
culture on the Deepwater Horizon platform had be more focused on understanding what
the negative pressure test actually meant, the accident could perhaps have been avoided.
The BP report concluded that the requirements and test guideline related to what is an
accepted negative pressure test should be evaluated (Graham et al., 2011). This accident
is a perfect example that the well integrity knowledge needs to be improved.
• Human computer interface: The amount of information in different parts of operation has
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been identified as a challenge. A good example illustrating this is the driller in the drilling
cabin offshore. The drillers responsibilities are many, combined with operation of equip-
ment with severe technical complexity makes the driller dependent on extensive use of
cameras, telephone, and radio communication due to inadequate view. All the impres-
sions and information from the monitors can be to much too handle for the driller. Stud-
ies done by PSA and DNV shows that a number of drillers sometimes work to hard and
have to much information to process at once (Asland et al., 2005, 2007). This is a danger-
ous practise an may lead to catastrophic situations. HO factor analysis should therefore
be performed to reduce the amount of information the driller has to evaluate and handle.
Challenges related to the technical element was identified and categorised as Qualification
and testing of well barrier elements, verification of well barrier elements and automation:
• Qualification and testing of well barrier elements: Some well barrier equipment, crucial
for well integrity fall outside the specs of the NORSOK D-010 standard. This has been
identified as a challenge in the industry. Today the ISO standard 14310 can be used on
equipment that fall outside the specs of the NORSOK D-010 standard. The standard de-
fines the leak criteria that are generally used for other equipment that is defined in the
standard (Vignes, 2011). There are some identified shortcomings related to the ISO 14310
concerning qualification of equipment and well barriers (Statoil., 2011). The testing of
various equipment does not meet the conditions the equipment meets out in the field.
The test interval is only required to last 15 minutes when the equipment are expected to
last the life of the well. The standard does not include a long term integrity test. The test-
ing is performed in a new and centralized casing, but the installed equipment is placed in
non-centralized deviated wells and can experience casing wear over time (Statoil., 2011).
The ISO testing is performed for the maximum and minimum values of the equipment
performance parameters. Many operators use the equipment somewhere between the
maximum and minimum parameters which means that the equipment is not sufficient
tested to handle those conditions (Vignes, 2011). To ensure that the equipment can han-
dle the conditions experienced in the field, the equipment should be tested according to
the loads, temperature, fluids and pressure the equipment will be exposed to during the
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life cycle of the well. According to Vignes (2011) the implementation of the equipment
qualification and testing should probably be defined with a basis in field performance.
• Verification of well barrier elements: Limitations related to the information about cement
location, cement channeling or cement contamination has been identified as a challenge.
Verification of a cement plug is performed according to NORSOK D-010. Receiving full
returns is used as an indicator of cement not being lost to the formation, but it provides
limited information about the cement location, cement channeling or cement contami-
nation (Graham et al., 2011). Proper cement placement, and the mechanical properties
of the cement design and logging tools needs further development to be able to verify the
cement integrity.
• Automation: Technical challenges related to the tubing computer has been identified. Im-
portant graphs maid by the tubing computer may look acceptable at first, but with in-
creased resolution the true meaning of the graph is reviled and the graph may not be ac-
cepted after all (Vam Service, 2010). Other challenges are associated with the HO factors
and the operators who monitor and verify the tubing and casing makeup graph. Tools
helpful to prevent unwanted events form happening and decision support tools during
the evaluation of the torque graph could be useful to help lift some of the stress the oper-
ators are facing in their working-day.
Challenges related to the organizational element was identified and categorised as national
and international standards and well integrity management system, handover documentation
and well barrier schematics:
• National and international standards: The sheer amount of standards and regulations,
and the constant updating and further development of this regulations are identified as
a challenge. The regulations is regulary updated and further developed to be able to be
as safe and effective as possible (PSA, 2011a). The regulations refer to the industrial stan-
dards, such as ISO, API and NORSOK standards, which means that they have to be con-
tinuously updated by the industry so that they can present the best practices available.
This updating proses natural introduces organizational challenges. Perhaps by convert-
ing all of the regulations into ISO standards may contribute to minimization of the or-
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ganizational challenges. This aspect was also identified in the PSA summary report after
the Deepwater Horizon accident including the need for established routines for regular
updating of the NORSOK standards (PSA, 2011a).
• Well integrity management system, handover documentation and well barrier schematics:
The minimum criteria for the WIMS and the required information needed in the handover
documentation are identified as a challenge. The OLF recommended guideline number
117 for well integrity describes the minimum criteria for the WIMS (OLF., 2011). The OLF
guideline focuses mainly on the operational phase. The WIMS should cover well integrity
at all times through the life cycle of the well. The WIMS should also define what informa-
tion is to be transferred in the handover documentation, and how this should be done.
Chapter 5 addresses this thesis project task number five. This chapter presents an overview
of the drilling operations at Veslefrikk from an human error causation paradigm point of view.
Today’s situation at Veslefrikk is compared with the finding of the original study conducted by
Asland et al. (2005, 2007); Vignes (2011); Vignes and Jayantha (2011) to highlight the improve-
ment that has been made. The intention was to underline the specific challenges in a sensitive
work environment in the offshore oil and gas drilling operations that have a large potential to
pose some serious threats to health, safety integrity, and work performance efficiency. The hu-
man error causation paradigm are illustrated in Figure 2.7 and include the engineering error
paradigm, individual error paradigm, cognitive error paradigm and organizational paradigm.
The paradigms look at the drilling working situation from different points of view
At Veslefrikk, the engineering error causation paradigm highlighted challenges related to
the driller’s chair, placement of the communication equipment(control, switches, radio com-
munication etc.), Disturbing elements (many unnecessary telephone calls and people in the
drilling cabin), Alarms with no essential function and amount of the drillers workload. Compar-
ison with the original study indicates that the situation on Veslefrikk is generally slightly better
then the overall industry. The feedback states for example that it is pretty easy to notify if people
is a disturbance, when they are in the drilling cabin on Veslefrikk. This has been identified as
a challenge in the overall industry. Information overload is reported as a big problem for the
drillers in the industry. The drilling supervisor at Veslefrikk states that this is a very rare or never
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a problem. Measures proposed to minimize or eliminate the challenges are listed in section
5.2.1.
At Veslefrikk, the individual error causation paradigm highlighted challenges related to the
service companies and their lack of risk understanding, difficulty locating relevant procedures,
the sheer amount of procedures that is involved in drilling operations and time pressure (for
time to time the driller is effected by time pressure related to the quality assurance of the work
program and not enough time to review the work descriptions in the shift meetings). Compar-
ison with the original study indicates that the situation on Veslefrikk is better than the overall
industry. According to Asland et al. (2005, 2007) is aspect related to SJA a problem in the indus-
try. Many drillers reported that occasionally they did not have time to conduct a SJA, and that
the SJA does not always help to bring attention to aspects regarding performing a safe job. This
is not a challenge on Veslefrikk. Measures proposed to minimize or eliminate the challenges are
listed in section 5.2.2.
At Veslefrikk, the cognitive error causation paradigm highlighted challenges related to the
installation-specific training (the training the driller receive is often not related to the job they
actually do, simulator training is not beyond training in pressure control simulations, seminar
where the team train together is not present and courses related to professional discipline is
lacking), time pressure and experience. Comparison with the original study indicates that the
situation on Veslefrikk is mostly the same as in the overall industry practices (Asland et al., 2005,
2007). Measures proposed to minimize or eliminate the challenges are listed in section 5.2.3.
At Veslefrikk, the organizational error causation paradigm highlighted challenges related
to the sheer amount of procedures, meetings is being prioritized ahead of actual drilling opera-
tion and the departure meeting are too general (not confident in the job is a result of to general
information). Comparison with the original study indicates that the situation on Veslefrikk is
better than the overall industry practice. According to Asland et al. (2005, 2007); Vignes (2011);
Vignes and Jayantha (2011) shows the original survey that the development of competence is a
challenge in drill operations because fo the fluctuation on the activity levels on the NCS. Chal-
lenges related to the incorrect use of radios, cultural differences and communication between
different deck are also identified as problems for the industry. The feedback indicates that this
complex challenges is non existing on Veslefrikk. Measures proposed to minimize or eliminate
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the challenges are listed in section 5.2.4.
6.2 Recommendations for Further Work
This thesis is conducted by a non professional in the specialized field of HO factors. Models
and methods presented might not be as relevant in practical use due to shortcoming of each
method and the degree of overlapping between methods. The questionnaire survey given to
Veslefrikk has some shortcomings related to the human error causation paradigms and might
be a contributing factor to prevent the full potential of the method. The understanding of why
the situation is overall better on Veslefrikk has great value to the industry, the proven measures
on Veslefrikk can be implemented in the industry and help rise the overall work performance.
The results from the survey conducted in this thesis may unfortunately be a false indicator for
the "true" situation on Veslefrikk. Only one viewpoint from one individual is analysed an math-
ematically speaking this is not enough to show the "true" situation on Veslefrikk. Recommen-
dations is classified as short-term, medium-term and long-term recommendations:
• The short-term recommendation for further work is to obtain a more detailed literary
study of the methods to be able to identify which method is best suited for the industry
for a more practical use. Collaboration and discussion with the industry is recommended
to obtain the methods for "best practice" out in the field.
• The medium-term recommendation for further work is to analyse the situation in the in-
dustry with the STEPP method. Shortcomings in STEPP method will most likely become
visible and it is therefore recommended to take the STEPP method a bit further and com-
bine the assessments of four different analytical methods (STEPP, Safety Culture Ques-
tionnaire (SCQ), Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach (SHERPA)
and Focus Groups (FG)) to examine the range of underlying HO factors.
• The long-term recommendation for further work is to customize the questionnaire survey
(Appendix B) to be more appealing for the human error causation paradigm point of view.
Important influencing factors might be hidden due to imprecise questions which hinders
the method to minimize critical influencing factors and "push" the industry towards the
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"best practice" in the field. A deeper understanding of why the situation on Veslefrikk is
better that the overall industry is recommended, to help the industry increase the overall
work performance. This can be done by figuring out which implemented measures that
was put into place on Veslefrikk, as a result of the PSA and DNV study, then identify which
of the measures that had any effect. More individual viewpoints from the industry should
also be collected and analysed to better reveal the "true" situation on Veslefrikk.
Appendix A
Acronyms
ALARP As low as reasonably practicable
API American petroleum Institute
DHSV Down hole safety valve
DNV Det Norske Veritas
GEMS A generic error-modeling system
HEI Human error identification
HEP Human error probabilities
HEQ Human error qualification
HER Human error reduction
HMI Human machine interface
HSE Health, safety and environment
HSEMS Health, safety and environmental management systems
HO factors Human and organizational factors
HRA Human reliability assessment
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HTO Human-,technology- ans organizational perspective
ISO International organization for standardization
MPD Manage pressure drilling
NCS Norwegian continental shelf
OLF Norwegian oil and gas association
PIFs Performance influencing factors
PRA Probabilistic risk assessment
PRSA Probabilistic safety assessment. Also referred to as PSA
PSA Petroleum safety authority, Norway
SJA Safe job analyses
SLMV Slips, lapses, mistakes, and violations
SRK Skill-, rule-, knowledge
STEPP Sequential time event plotting procedure
THERP Technique for human error rate prediction
USNRC US nuclear regulatory commission
WBE Well barrier elements
WBS Well barrier schematics
WHW questions What, how and why questions
WIF Well Integrity Forum
WIMS Well integrity management system
Appendix B
Questionnaire survey
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